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This thesis research focused on the identification and characterization of the
barriers which impede institutionalization of Total Quality Management (TQM)
concepts in the Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition system. Barriers were
identified and characterized by survey of public and private sector individuals
knowledgeable about TQM and experienced in the DuD acquisition system. The
quality philosophy described by Dr. W. Edwards Deming was the primary
foundation for analysis. Althougii many barriers were identified, the research
analyzed the top six barriers identified by respondents. In order of precedence,
they were: Management Willingness to Change, the Competition in Contracting Act
of 1984, Congressional Oversight, DoD Acceptance and Inspection Procedures,
Single Year Budgeting, and Management Mobility. Major conclusions were: (1)
Institutionalization of TQM involves a cultural shift in how managers view
leadership, (2) Barriers rooted in statute or regulation demand leadership's
attention, (3) A prerequisite for command positions must include a profound
understanding of total quality, (4) The political environment that influences the
DoD acquisition system, also affects DoD's ability to institutionalize total quality,
(5) Enhancement of Government customer and contractor supplier long term
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The Executive Branch, particularly the Department of Defense (DoD), has
officially adopted Total Quality Management (TQM) as the philosophical and
practical guiding principles by which it will manage resources in the 1990's and
hence into the next century [Ref. l:p. 1-21. Some of the baseline principles of TQM
fly in the face of traditional government and military acquisition management
approaches [Ref 2). Since DoD has adopted TQM as the management style of the
future, there must be significant enhancements that TQM can bring to the
management of DoD, one of the most complex public organizations in the world.
The TQM approach is fundamentally different, yet high level managers are
embracing and implementing the new philosophy with ever increasing
enthusiasm.
TQM, as DoD has adopted it, is in essence the concept and organizational
management philosophy espoused by Dr. W. Edwards Deming. While the term,
"Made in Japan", once invoked images of flimsy construction and poor quality,
today it represents quite the reverse. Companies who have not achieved world
class success utilizing traditiona! American business practices are now converting
to new management philosophies similar to Deming's. For U.S. companies who
have transformed their companies utilizing TQM-like work ethics, the story is not
one of declining profits and market share. These companies are now associated
with high product quality standards and there is the potential for rebounding in
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the market. Share of the market grows as an inherent outgrowth of the living out
of the TQM philosophy and prosperity increases. Prosperity does not mean that
companies who adopt TQM-like principles are getting rich at faster rates. It
means that they are goal oriented towards staying in business, providing a
reputable product or service to the public, while maintaining employment and a
happy and motivated work force.
DoD's shift in management philosophy is necessary to maximize its
management of resources, improve the quality of military capability with
declining force structures, and improve the public's perception of the value of
spending taxpayer dollars for advanced armed forces. Within the Federal
Government, and specifically within DoD, there is a perception that TQM concepts
are difficult to tailor for appropriate application within the all encompassing
acquisition process (for use by DoD and defense contractors). Often statutory law
and departmental regulations are cited as impediments to TQM implementation
and utilization in the acquisition of hardware, goods, and services.
B. OBJ ECTIV ES OFTHE RESEARCH
The purpose of this research is to identify and rank barriers which impede
institutionalization of TQM principles in the DoD acquisition process. Along with
identification of the impediments (or barriers), the purpose is to understand the
nature of these barriers, and to determine if these barriers are internally or
externally controllable by DoD (e.g., to what extent are the barriers linked to
Government laws, regulations, or internal DoD policies). Finally, this research
seeks to present options regarding how the barriers to using TQM in the DoD
acquisition system might be overcome.
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C. RESEARCH QUESTION
Given the preceding objectives, the following primary research question was
posed: What Federal procurement statutory, regulatory and policy barriers exist
which prevent or impede the ability of the Department of Defense to embrace Total
Quality Management (TQM) concepts in the acquisition process and how might
these barriers be overcome?
The following secondary research questions are deemed pertinent to this
research effort:
1. What is the concept of TQM, principally as approached by Dr. W. Edwards
Deming? What is DoD's concept?
2. How does TQM differ from traditional management concepts currently
practiced by DoD?
3. What statutes, regulations, policies, or work ethics act as the most
significant impediments to institutionalizing TQM concepts in the DoD
acquisition process?
4. How might the impediments or barriers be reduced or eliminated?
1). SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The purpose of this research is to determine which Deming'TQM concepts
conflict with current acquisition statute requirements, regulation requirements,
and policy provisions. The intent of the research is principally to identify barriers
and explore the nature of those barriers in relation to Deming's new quality
philosophy. The objective is not to explore how each conflict might be resolved in a
detailed manner, but rather to pose solutions as they appear evident, or
recommended by those questioned in the data gathering process.
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E. METHOI)OLOGY
The methodology employed in this research consisted of the following
components: (1) examination of the literature base, (2) survey of DoD and defense
industry high level acquisition managers with significant TQM knowledge and
experience, (3) follow-up interviews with selected survey individuals, and (4)
researcher attendance of Dr. Deming's Quality, Productivity and Competitive
Position Seminar.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THETHESIS
This thesis is organized into six chapters. The first chapter is an introduction
to the thesis. Chapter [ provides background information regarding the concept of
TQM as espoused by Dr. Deming and DoD. The background chapter provides an
understanding of Deming's concept of "profound knowledge" and attempts to show
how Dr. Deming's approach is fundamentally more in depth than DoD's approach
at this point in time. The third chapter presents the methodology used to gather
data and demographic information concerning survey participants. Chapter III
also provides some of the results related to demographical information. Chapter
IV presents the survey data regarding barrier identification and ranking. The
fifth chapter provides the survey respondents characterization of the top barriers
and is also the researcher's analysis of the top barriers. The researcher's analysis
is primarily based on the principles taught by Dr. Deming and other Deming





The traditional method to ensure a quality product or service in American
industry has been to pay more for "higher quality" or "inspect in" quality. In the
U.S., the customer has been disappointed by industry's level of quality and has
looked to foreign sources as the benchmarks for what once was without question a
major U.S. strength [Ref. 3:p. iii-xi].
Within the Defense acquisition systemn, the option to depend on off-shore
weapons development and hardware solutions is not a viable alternative for
support of the entire defense establishment for many reasons. Thus, without
foreign competition in the Defense acquisition system there is not the same
influence as can be found in the commercial environment to hold costs down while
delivering quality prodicts.
Competition initiatives within the defense acquisition system have perhaps
reduced the pace at which costs have been escalating since the late 170's, but still
DoD is criticized by the public and the Congress for buying unreliable systems at
tremendous cost to a seriously leveraged Government treasury [Ref. 3:p. i-iil.
This problem of declining quality, rising costs, and poor public perception is
not new. Much of the initiative to improve the defense establishment's downward
trend has been in reform of acquisition regulations and policies, both from within
DoD, and externally from Congress. The list of studies, commissions, and reports
involving DoD acquisition practices has become quite lengthy [Ref. 4].
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Lawmaking and regalating by taking one acquisition problem at a time has not
seemed to work in attempting to improve the acquisition .3ystem as a whole. A
highly complex "system" of acquisition, intended to control and incentivize DoD
managers and defense contractors, has evolved into a maize of laws, regulations,
policies, initiatives, and studies, with change upon change to the acquisition
system [Ref. S:p. 431.
Emerging from this maize appears to be a major change in the "culture" of
how the defense establishment conducts business. The culture of continuous
improvement is DoD's umbrella under which the acquisition reform will occur.
The solution, therefore, is more than changing the status quo. It is an evaluation
and improvement of the entire system, given a set of TQM guidelines.
The following discussion focuses on the foundations of those guidelines as
espoused by Dr. W. Edwards Deming and the DoD.
B. THE DEMING CUIrURIAL CONCEI'
Dr. W. Edwards Deming is well known as the statistician who greatly
influenced the recovery of Japanese industry during the post WW I era. In 1980,
he became known in the United States, after NBC television produced a
documentary program citing Deming's contributions to Japanese industry [Ref.
6:p. 31. His most widely known philosophies regarding guiding principles
for business are held in-his now famous, "14 Points" and the "Deadly Diseases".
One of the earlier versions of Deming's 14 Points introduced in the military was
distributed on cards at a Deming User's Group meeting in February 1985 in San
Diego. The card was printed by Naval Air Rework Facility, North Island (now tne
Naval Aviation Depot) [Ref. 7:p. 43i.
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The DoD has not cxplicitly named Dr. W. Edwards Deming's 14 Points and
the Deadly Diseases as the foundation that supports DoD's TQM initiative, nor
does Dr. Deming call his philosophy TQM. However, to most DoD TQM
proponents, Dr. Deming's management philosophies are acknowledged as the
fundamental standard and the backbone of the DoD effort.
1. D~r. W. Edwards )eming's 14 Ioints and the Ieadly Iiseases
Below are listed the 14 points and deadly diseases. They represent the
fundamental precepts of the new management philosophy (principles for
transformation). Dr Deming has revised his 14 Points numerous times over the
years in order to emphasize the trends he sees as obstacles to quality and
productivity [Ref. 7 :p. 42). The 14 points and deadly diseases apply to every type of
business, i.e., production companies, service sector companies, and the public
sector (government services) [Ref 8:p. 231. Essentially, the philosophy applies to
any enterprise that has customers. TQM is customer oriented. Since DoD does
have a product and service which it provides to the nation, TQM can apply to the
operation of the defense system in the U.S.
The 14 Points (1 Oct 90 version) [Ref. 91:
1. Create and publish to all employees a statement of the aims and purposes of
the company or other organization. The management must demonstrate
constantly their commitment to this statement.
2. Learn the new philosophy, top management and everybody.
3. Understand the purpose of inspection, for improvement of processes and
reduction of cost.
4. End the practice of awarding business on the basis of price tag alone.
5. Improve constantly and forever the system of production and service.
6. Institute training (for skills).
7. Teach and institute leadership.
8. Drive out fear. Create trust. Create a climate for innovation.
9. Optimize toward the aims and purposes of the company the efforts of teams,
groups, and staff areas, too.
10. Eliminate exhortations for the work force.
11. (a) Eliminate numerical quotas for production. Instead, learn and institute
methods f)r improvement.
(b) Eliminate M.B.O. (Management by Objective). Instead, learn the
capabilities of processes, and how to improve them.
12. Remove barriers that rob people of pride of workmanship.
13. Encourage education and self-improvement for everyone.
14. Take action to accomplish this transformation.
In addition, Dr. Deming points out the Deadly Diseases which impact on
the success or failure of implementation of the Fourteen Points [Ref. 6 :p. 361[Ref
8:p. 97-98]:
1. Lack of constancy of purpose to plan product and service that will have a
market and keep the company in business, and provide jobs.
2. Emphasis on short-term profits.
3. Evaluation of performance, merit rating, or annual review.
4. Mobility of management;job hopping.
5. Management by use only of visible figures, with little or no consideration of
figures that are unknown or unknowable.
6. Excessive medical costs.
7. Excessive costs of liability, fueled by lawyers that work on contingency fees.
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2. A System of Profound Knowledge
Those less knowledgeable about TQM often evaluate the depth of
understanding required for this new quality philosophy as only Dr. Deming's 14
points. To truly understand TQM, it must be studied and internalized first within
individuals and then the organization.
In recent writings, Dr. Deming has discussed his concept of the System of
Profound Knowledge that is necessary to change the traditional management
approach to a style of management by optimization. lie states that an individual
does not have to be "eminent" in any of the four parts of the System of Profound
Knowledge in order to grasp the concept and apply it, but an understanding of each
area and how they interrelate will lead to a system of optimization [Ref. 10:p. 101.
An outgrowth of the understanding and application of the system of
profound knowledge is that "The 14 points for management in industry, education,
and government follow naturally..." [Ref. 10:p. 111. The four parts to the System of
Profound Knowledge are as follows:
" Appreciation for a system
" Statistical theory (theory of variation)
* Theory of knowledge
* Psychology
A manager must recognize that the four points above interact with each
other and that an understanding of them is necessary in order to optimize the
overall aim of the organization.
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a. Appreciation for a System
Dr. Deming depicts a business organization as analogous to an
orchestra. A good orchestra functions cohesively as a eam in order to please the
listener. Each member of the orchestra is there to support the other members,
therefore there is a large degree of interdependence in order to achieve the aim.
[Ref 10:p. 151
fow I ing 'l'cuni )rchcstra Business
Low ------------------- x ----------------------------------------- x ..----------- x ------------ ifigh
Degree of Inlerdependence
Although members of an orchestra may practice separately under different
instructors, they do not all play solos at the same time. Just as an orchestra has a
conductor, a business must have leaders who manage with optimization as the aim
of the organization. Dr. Deming writes:
The performance of any component is to be judged in terms of its contribution
to the aim of the system, not for its individual production or profit, nor for any
other competitive measure. Some components may operate at a loss to
themselves, for optimization of the whole system, including the components
that take a loss. [Ref 10:p. 15]
Any system that results in a win, lose structure is suboptimized [Ref 11.
Optimization of a system should be the basis for negotiation between any two
people, between divisions, between union and management, between
competitors, between countries. Everybody would gain. [Ref 10:p. 161
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The two greatest forces of failure to optimize a system are, (1)
failure to evaluate the consequences of short-term performance, and (2) failure to
optimize haman resources. Ranking people induces conflict. Optimization of the
system is destroyed by these forces, claims Deming. [Ref 10:p. 171
Asystem must have guidance from external sources in order to
facilitate the instruction of profound knowledge. In the orchestra example, a
master musician may be called upon to assist the members of the orchestra to
function more effectively as a whole.
"Precise optimization is not necessary", nor would it be easy to
define, writes Deming. According to the Taguchi loss function, a system needs to
come close to the point of optimization, not precisely to that point in order to
achieve the desired optimization [Ref 10:p. 181. Deming believes that it is
management's job to "come close to the point of optimization and stay there" [Ref.





Figure 2-1 The Taguchi Loss Function
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b. Knowledge of the Theory of Variation (Statistical Theory)
Managing a system must include the knowledge of what a stable
system is, variation, and the causes of variation (common causes and special
causes). This includes the variation found in processes, systems, and people [Ref.
10:p. 181.
Deming was instrumental in the U.S. industry's use of statistical
process control (SPC) during the war production effort of the early 1940's. When
the war ended, SPC lost its stature as a key production tool when quality began to
take a back seat to mass production of consumer goods. During that period of
America's history, there was no foreign competition for the goods the U.S. had to
offer [Ref. 6 :p. 7-8]. Without top management support for continuous
improvement, SPC did not survive [Ref. 8:p. 3241.
In regard to understanding a stable system, it should be noted that it
will exhibit some fluctuations caused entirely by random variation. These
variations are called common causes. Special causes of variation, on the other
hand, will cause the system to operate in an unstable manner. In a stable system,
all of the special causes of variation have been eliminated. For instance,
absenteeism, a common governmental concern, may exhibit the characteristics of a
stable system if absentees are within a certain range over a period of time. Special
causes of variation may affect absentees, thereby indicating that absentees are
above or below what is normally expected. If the system is stable, then only
management can improve the output of that system [Ref. 8:p. 3251. In order to
improve a stable system, management must take some action to improve the
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overall system. Common causes are of a systemic nature, and only management
can change the system.
c. Theory of Knowledge
The Theory of Knowledge, as it applies to an individual's
appreciation, for a System of Profound Knowledge is the acknowledgement that
decisions based on experience, exclusive of theory, will ultimately yield
suboptimization. Conversely, there is no understanding of the system if decisions
are based solely on theory and devoid of experience. [Ref. 10:p. 211
A foundation of the difference between common cause problems and
special cause problems is also necessary. As expressed above, a common cause
problem is a problem that is inherent in the system, whereas problems attributed
to special causes are related to individual events. Deming estimates that 94% of
the problems are caused by the system, whereas 6% are caused by special events.
Common cause failures are the responsibility of management. [Ref. 8:p. 3141
A system managed by individuals who do not have an
understanding of theory, may rely on their "experience" to correct problems.
Without an understanding of the theory, the system will not be improved
inasmuch as the management is unable to distinguish between common and
special causes. [Ref. 8:p. 3171
d. Knowledge of P'sychology
The Knowledge of Psychology applies to the effectiveness of
leadership. Without an understanding of behavior, and each person's "innate need
for self esteem and respect", leadership will not be effective in bringing out the
intrinsLc motivation that each person is born with [Ref. 1O:p. 91.
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Extrinsic motivation is submission to external forces that neutralize
intrinsic motivation. Pay is not a motivator. Under extrinsic motivation,
learning and joy in learning in school are submerged in order to capture top
grades. On the job, joy in work, and innovation, become secondary to a good
rating. Under extrinsic motivation, one is ruled by external forces. lie tries to
protect what he has. He tries to avoid punishment. lie knows not joy in
earning. Extrinsic motivation is a zero-defect mentality [Ref. 10:p. 241.
(Researcher emphasis.)
Deming emphasizes that it is the responsibility of leaders to
understand the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation...to
understand that not all people are alike. Management's decision to make changes
to improve systems must include a knowledge of what truly motivates and gives
joy to people in their work. He also warns that, "removal of a demotivator does not
create motivation" [Ref. 10:p. 2 2 ]. The following examples from Deming are
illustrative of the point:
Forces of Destruction of Intrinsic Motivation [Ref. 10:p.261
* Grades in School - Gold Stars for Athletics.
* Merit System. Judge people; put them into slots. Competition between
people, groups, divisions.
* Incentive Pay. Pay for performance.
" M. B. 0. and management by the numbers.
* Business plans with reports on monthly or quarterly targets.
• Quotas for production, daily or weekly.
• Suboptimization. Demanding that every group, every division, show a
profit.
Just removing these forces of destruction are not enough, they have
to be replaced with leadership. Deming states:
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One is born with intrinsic motivation, self-esteem, dignity. He inherits joy
in work,joy in learning. These attributes are high at the beginning of life, but
are gradually crushed by the forces of destruction. These forces rob people, and
the nation, of innovation and applied science. We must replace these forces
with leadership that will restore the power of the individual [Ref. 10: p. 26].
Deming's philosophy and DoD's traditLonal management modus
operandi are in conflict, though. Why is it so hard for DoD manager's to adopt
TQM principles? DoD has attempted to change the system by mandating TQM as
the management philosophy that DoD will manage by. It is not that simple. The
problem begins with how U.S. managers view the environment that they manage
in. Dr. Kosaka Yosida, a long time student of Dr. Deming's, makes the comparison
between the traditional American management style and the Japanese
management philosophy. He states that in America there is more tolerauce for
variation in a system, whereas in the Japanese culture there is a clear notion of
what comprises desirability. Below is a comparison of the Japanese, "whole-istic"
view of management and the American, "analytic" approach to management as
described by Dr. Yoshida [Ref. 12]:
Holistic Thinking Analytic Thinking
Total is more than the parts Individual parts are separate
Cooperation Competition
Desirability Acceptability
Taguchi Loss Function targets Specification limits
Continuous Improvement Zero Defects
System variation control Ranking
Team design Secret design
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Corporate constancy of purpose No specific purpose
Long run vision Short run goals
Deming's 14 Points Management by Objective
Permanent commitment Replacement
Dr. Yoshida describes these two types of thinking by saying that
holistic thinking starts with a target of optimization and as one moves away from
that optimum point of desirability, the desirability becomes gradually less and
less. Analytic Thinking establishes a range of acceptability, beyond which is
unacceptability [Ref. 11 and Ref. 12:p. 31. See Figure 5-2, below. Customers
understand the concept of desirability, but supplier management has failed to
optimize desirability of products and services, thus customers go elsewhere.
HOLISTIC THINKING ANALYTIC THINKING
Figure 5-2 Holistic vs. Analytic Thinking
How will DoD management begin to think "whole-istically"? The answer lies in
DoD's ability to teach its managers an understanding of profound knowledge.
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Dr. Deming describes prevailing management practices as the walls
of a prison. The managers are in a prison created by their own management
practices.
The prevailing practice of management came from theory that grew up 50
to 100 years ago. The world has changed: the theory of long ago no longer
works. The practices of management that were our strength 50 to 100 years
ago have today become the walls of a prison [Ref. 11].
The walls of the prison are succinctly given as follows: [Ref. 1 II
9 Short term planning.
* Ranking people, teams, divisions. Ranking causes conflict and
competition.
9 Management by results. Taking management action on symptoms,
not root causes. "A mind is not required for this kind of
management". "Costs are not causes: costs come from causes".
* Confusion regarding the differences between common causes and
special causes. (Tampering).
* Work standards and quotas.
* Management by numbers. ("Do it; I don't care how you do it; just do
it".)
* Spending inordinate amounts of time fighting fires.
In order to break down the walls of the prison, Dr. Deming states that change must
be actively led by management who understands the transformation necessary.
He says that management must understand profound knowledge.
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A leader today must understand the limitations of the old theories and the
practices of management that they led to. A leader of today must adopt a
theory for today's world, and must develop an appropriate system for
management of his theory. The theory that he requires is knowledge about a
system and optimization thereof. [Ref. 1 ]
3. SUMMARY OFTHE DEMING NEW QUALITY PIiLOSOPHlY
Some critics of TQM say that Deming's thoughts apply only to production
applications. It is widely held by Deming and his quality associates that the notion
that TQM applies only to production processes is false. The new quality philosophy
applies to any system that has a product and customers. With regard to
government service, Deming states:
In most governmental services, there is no market to capture. In place of
capture of the market, a governmental agency should deliver economically
their service prescribed by law or regulation. The aim should be distinction in
service. Continual improvement in government service would earn
appreciation of the American public and would hold jobs in the service, and
help industry to create more jobs. [Ref. 8:p. 61
In order to determine whether or not the new quality philosophy is a
good fit for utilization in the DoD acquisition system, there must be an
understanding of Dr. Deming's 14 points, the deadly diseases, and the theory of
profound knowledge. The theory of profound knowledge determines that all
management must have a baseline of understanding regarding appreciation for a
system, statistical theory, theory of knowledge, and a fundamental understanding
of human nature (psychology).
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C. 'I'QM AS AI)OI'TED BIIY THE DEI*A RTMEN'I'OF EFENSE
TQM and Deming's philosophy are not synonymous (Ref 12 :p. 31. The DoD's
definition of TQM does not expressly espouse the Deming concept of quality
improvement. However, much of the concepts provided by Deming are outlined in
DoD's recent Total Quality Management Guide (Volumes I and 1I). It is very
difficult to define TQM in an encapsulating paragraph. DoD's most common
definition of TQM is as follows:
Total Quality Management (TQM) is both a philosophy and a set of guiding
principles that represent the foundation of a continuously :mproving
organization. TQM is the application of quantitative methods and human
resources to improve the material and services supplied to an organization,
and the degree to which the needs of the customer are met, now and in the
future. TQM integrates fundamental management techniques, existing
improvement efforts, and technical tools under a disciplined approach focused
on continuous improvement. [Ref. 3:p. 1
If a novice to the new philosophy took this definition at face value and did not
digest the supporting information that DoD provides in the TQM Handbook, then
that individual would probably come away thinking that TQM is nothing new.
DoD's definition "integrates fundamental management techniques" to accomplish
TQM. DoD's literature regarding TQM is not entirely clear as to which
management techniques are no longer appropriate. Deming boldly states, "Focus
on outcome (management by the numbers, zero defects, appraisal of performance)
must be abolished, leadership put in place" [Ref. 5:p. 541. Deming is clear about
which management practices are not compatible with the new quality philosophy.
Specifically, DoD has not established a position regarding performance
appraisals and the long term buyer-supplier relationship as called out by Deming
19
in his 14 Points and Deadly Diseases. This does not mean that there is no effort
underway to address these barriers, only that DoD's TQM concept cannot presently
embrace these two areas due to external pressures.
One journalist's statement reflects the inherent desire of the general
population to reach a workable definition:
Despite TQM's high visibility throughout the department, DoD has adopted
no official definition. DoD literature typically refers to it as a management
approach focused on continuous process improvement. [Ref. 14:p. 91
The DoD would likely contest this statement by stating that its philosophy is
a combination of Deming, Juran, Fieguenbaum, Ishikawa, and Taguchi [Ref. 13];
very much in line with Deming's philosophy except for the issues of performance
appraisals and long term relationships between the DoD and its suppliers. (The
Competition In Contracting Act of 1984 mnandates full and open competition of all
procurements with very few exceptions). However, DoD has adopted an approach
that is very distinct from its traditional ..,aiageintnt practice within the
department.
The Undersecretary c,^ Defenso (Acquisition), the Honorable John A. Betti
conveys his conceptualization of TQM as four basic pillars [Ref 15:p. 6-71:
Customer. The customer is the focus of everything we do. We must be
customer-driven. The objective is to anticipate, meet and to exceed customer
wants and needs. This includes both the external and internal customer.
Quality. Quality is defined by the customer. Quality must be the #1
priority of the enterprise. Quality takes precedence over all other
considerations, including cost and production schedules.
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Continuous Process Improvement. It's a fact of life that customer
expectations will continue to rise and we must continue to improve in
anticipation of that fact. Durable improvement can only be obtained by
focusing on the process, not the product. By the time a product exists. it's too
late for anything except inspection and remedial action. It's axiomatic that a
high quality process will yield a high quality, lower cost product or service.
People are the most important ingredient of any process. Unless they share
common goals, have a common vision of success and are willing, as a team, to
devote their minds and energies to their achievements, the enterprise will fail.
Secretary Betti also states that along with these pillars, the key ingredients
for successful implementation of TQM within DoD are: Understanding the
Concept, Commitment, Alignment, and Focus on Root Causes.
It is important to note that Betti's remarks reflect the substance of profound
knowledge that Dr. Deming stresses. Betti does emphasize that to some, TQM may
be just another slogan, but to him it is not. He states, it will require "dedication,
education, and patience" in order for TQM to make fundamental improvements in
DoD[Ref. 15:p. 81.
Laurie A. Brodeling, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for TQM indicates
that DoD is making headway in instituting 'I'QM:
Leadership in DoD is actively formulating plans for Total Quality
Management in the next few years. The challenge that lies ahead in changing
our culture is daunting. However, there is no doubt that we have a critical
mass of senior leaders who are actively deploying this approach. The defense
establishment and our industry partners have achieved a degree of maturity
in growing Total Quality Management into a viable, operating acquisition
management concept. We are beginning to "walk our talk '[Ref. 16:p. 71.
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Indeed, there are many indications that DoD is making headway in
implementing TQM in the acquisition system. Deming himself stated this to the
researcher at a four day seminar [Ref. 111. Again, the aim of this research is to
expose those barriers that are most significantly blocking long run success of full




A questionnaire was used to identify, rank, and characterize those elements
considered to be barriers to fully implementing TQM in the DoD acquisition
system.
The first objective of the questionnaire was identification of perceived
barriers to TQM within the acquisition system, the significance of those barriers,
and the respondents' recommendations regarding the elimination of those barriers.
The second objective of the questionnaire was to gather the respondents'
perception regarding the degree of control for influencing change to eliminate those
barriers, e.g., how easily might the barrier be eliminated (by DoD internally).
Therefore, an effort was made to determine if the identified barriers were mostly
influenced by Government laws or regulations, internal policy, or neither.
The purpose in utilization of a questionnaire was not to allow statistical
analysis of the responses, i.e., a nonstatistical sampling approach was employed.
The questionnaire is presented in Appendix A.
B. QUESTIONNAIRE STiRUCTUtE
The questionnairewas comprised of the the following subparts (see Appendix
A for detailed survey format):
Section I Demographics
Section II Barrier Identification
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Section m1 Barrier Ranking
Section IV Top barrier Open Explanation
The survey focused on the ranking (significance) of the barriers, and a
characterization of the respondent's top 2 barriers in the Top Barrier Open
Explanation (Section IV of the questionnaire).
C. SOI.ICITATIONS, RESPONSES, AN) l)EMOGRAIHICS
1. Solicitation
Approximately 65 questionnaires were mailed to individuals the
researcher had gathered from various recommended sources, the Joint OSD - Air
Force- Industry Study of June 1989 [Ref. 21, and sources found in the quality
management literature. The objective was to obtain responses from high
level/experienced acquisition managers (from both DoD and industry) who also
possessed an in-depth knowledge of TQM concepts.
2. Responses
There were 32 responses to the questionnaire. Two responses were
received after the cutoff date but were not included in the analysis. The response
rate of approximately 50 percent was considered successful, and is perhaps
attributable to the high interest that acquisition managers have in improving the
acquisition process and system through adoption of TQM principles.
3. Demographic Data
The following demographic data reflect the average acquisition
experience as indicated by each respondent, the number of governmental and
industry respondents, the respondents' familiarity with TQM concepts, and a
listing of the job title profiles of the respondents.
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a. Average Acquisition Experience
Each respondent provided the number of years of acquisition
experience in order to gain an understanding of the degree of the respondent's
familiarity with DoD's acquisition system. The term acquisition was not defined in
the questionnaire, therefore a variety of acquisition experience was received.
Some respondents were very familiar with Government laws and regulations
regarding acquisition, while others were experienced in commercial buying
practices, with some exposure to the specifics of Government law and regulation
affecting the DoD acquisition system. Table 3-1 depicts the demographic data
obtained from each respondent.
b. JobTitle Profiles
In order to convey the high degree of respondent credibilitw the,
researcher feels it important to list the job titles of respondents. See Table 3-2
below.
D. SUMMARY
As depicted in Table 3-1, the sample population consisted of 19 government
respondents (59%) and 13 industry respondents (41%). Twelve respondents
considered themselves TQM Experts, 16 respondents considered themselves Very
Familiar with TQM concepts, and 4 respondents considered themselves Somewhat
Familiar with TQM concepts. Each respondent judged himself or herself either an
Expert, Very Familiar, or Somewhat Familiar with Deming's philosophy.
The researcher was very much encouraged by the interest shown by
respondents. The depth and earnestness of the responses led to the researcher's
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RESPONDENT ACQUISITION AND TQM BACKGROUND
YEARS OF ACQUISITION EXPERIENCE
(by level of TQM expertise)


















Notes: 1) * denotes DoD industry respondent.
2) There were 19 government respondents (59%) and 13 industry
respondents (41%)
3) There were 12 respondents who considered themselves TQM
Experts, 16 respondents who considered themselves as Very
Familiar with TQM concepts, and 4 respondents who considered
themselves as Somewhat Familiar with TQM concepts.
TABLE 3-1
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RESPONDENT JOB TITLE PROFILES
Senior Vice President - Well known Quality Management Consulting Firm
Special Assistant to the Director of Engineering
Professor and Consultant - Assistant to Deming
Policy Manager
Director of'lechnical Data - DoD Systems Command
TQM Coordinator - DoD Systems Command
Professor - Student of Deming for 20 years
Vice President - Group Product Integrity - Large Corporation
Assistant to the Commander for Quality - Large DoD Component Headquarters
Vice President - Reputable Industry Association
Manager of Quality Improvement - Large Company
Professor of Engineering Management - Advanced Degree University
Director of Design Policy
Contracts Division Head
Professor of Contract Administration
Professor of Contract Management - Advanced Degree University
High Level DoD Civilian Appointee
Deputy Assistant Commander for Engineering and Design
Assistant Deputy for Special Projects
Contract Specialist - TQM Liaison for Regional Contracting Center
TABLE 3-2
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RESPONDENT JOB TITLE PROFILES (CONTINUED)
Manufacturing Manager
Assistant for Corporate Quality
Director, Contract Policy
Corporate Director for Quality - Large Corporation
Senior Quality Executive - Industry Association
Professor - Director of Business Management Department
Branch Head at Systems Command
Deputy Director for Engineering Design
President of Small (8A) Consulting Business
Procurement Analyst - Intermediate DoD Command
Director, Continuous Quality Improvement - Large Corporation
TABLE 3-2 (CONTINUED
increased understanding of Deming's concepts and their interaction with the
acquisition system. It was especially apparent from the expert respondents that
they indeed possessed a high level of profound understanding of Deming concepts




In order to determine which barriers are the most significant towards
impeding full implementation of TQM in the acquisition process, barrier
identification is necessary as a foundation. As previously discussed in Chapter 11,
in attempting to improve a system (in this case the DoD acquisition "system"), a
determination of special causes and common causes must be made prior to
implementing changes to the system. Otherwise the effect of making changes to
the system may generate problems, e.g., tampering. It would be perhaps,
unrealistic to attempt to bring the entire acquisition process under statistical
control in order to determine special and common causes of variation. But perhaps
someday the capability will exist to properly measure the effects of new acquisition
related statues, regulations, policies, and new programs, with a view to variatioM
within the system.
In this section, the objective is to identify those elements that are acting as
barriers to implementing TQM principles throughout the acquisition process. It
rationally follows that if such barriers cannot be eliminated or effectively reduced,
implementation of TQM in the DoD acquisition process may not reach its full
potential. Under these conditions, those firms which have successfully embraced
TQM are most likely not to be interested in DoD business.
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B. SURVEY DATA PRESENTATION
The following Tables depict the opinions of those questioned regarding
barrier significance in relation to the other potential barriers. The Tables are
categorically presented as follows:
Table 4-1 Barrier Overview
Table 4-2 Other Barriers
Table 4-3 Top 5 Barrier Rankings
Table 4-4 Top 2 Barrier Rankings
Table 4-5 Top 1 Barriers
Table 4-6 DoD Internal vs. External Control Barriers
Table 4-7 Trop I Barriers - Internal vs. External Control
Prior to each table is a descriptive synopsis of data extracted from the
respective table T'ie superscript numeral next to each barrier description
coincides wit.. the numeric order that the barrier appeared in the survey in
Appendix A.
I. Barrier Overview
Table 4-1 depicts the relative significance of each barrier as indicated by
the survey respondents in Section II of the survey (Appendix A). The barriers are
arranged in descending order with regard to significance; the most significant
barrier being first, and so on. Furthermore, the number of Expert, Very Familiar
(VF), and Somewhat Familiar (SF) responses are indicated. The ratio of Expert,
VF, and SF was 12: 16: 4, respectively, as discussed in Chapter II. For Table 4-1,
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a weighted points method was used to indicate each respondent's ranking of the
barriers. The points assigned to the respondents' answers were as follows:
Points Assigned Response Category
I No - Not a Barrier
2 Not Significant Barrier
3 Somewhat Significant Barrier
4 Significant Barrier
5 Very Significant Barrier
6 Insurmountable Barrier
a. Table 4-1 Synopsis
" Table 4-1 indicates that the most significant barrier is Management
Willingness to Change (127 total points).
* Weighted higher by Experts, but lower on a total points basis is DoD
SpecificatLons.
" An equal number of Expert points were assigned to Management Willingness
to Change and Training (50 points each).
" DoD Acceptance and Inspection Procedures and CICA were assigned an equal
number of points by Experts (49 points).
" There is a definite split between the first 7, and the last 8 barriers (13 point
spread), indicating possibly that the last 8 barriers are by nature of lesser
significance.
2. Other Barriers
Because respondents were requested to present additional barriers other
than the 15 barriers specifically cited in the survey, it is important to present those
additional barriers identified by respondents along with the frequency with which
they appeared. Table 4-2 reflects the additional barriers provided by respondents.
These barriers are grouped according to either, 1) Barriers related to




Barrier Rankingz IPXI'I'T VI" SI' TlOT11,
1 Manageent Willingness to Change 50 61 16 127
5 DoD Speciiications 53 56 11 120
9 Training 50 55 13 118
13 Single Year Budgeting 46 57 13 116
4 DoD Acceptance and Inspection Procedures 49 52 12 113
2 Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 49 48 10 107
12 Congressional Oversight 41 60 7 1W3
10 Socio-Economic Programs 31 48 11 90
14 Management Mobility 33 46 6 85
t1 Industry Labor Unions 30 47 6 83
7 Contractor Cost Recovery Systems 32 37 8 77
8 Ethics 28 37 10 75
6 Industrial Base Concerns 25 29 10 64
3 Buy American 22 33 3 58
15 0MB Circular A-109 16 23 7 46
TABLE 4-1
32
Traditional Management or Cultural practices. The barriers are presented as the
respondents expressed them. This dichotomy seemed appropriate to the researcher
inasmuch as barriers in these categories mnight be overcome by education or
change of management practices. Most likely, both education and management
change would be required, however.
3. Top 5 Barrier Rankings
Each respondent was asked to rank the barriers outlined in Table 4-1
into a new category representing the five barriers they perceived to be the most
significant. The results of the respondents ranking of the top 5 barriers is
represented in Table 4-3.
a. Table 4-3 Synopsis
" Not included (by any respondent) in the Top 5 Rankings was Industrial Base
Concerns.
* Buy American, OMB Circular A-109, and Industrial Base Concerns were not
ranked in the Top 5 by any expert.
" The largest point spread (11 points) was between the highest frequency
response (Management Willingnes. to Change) and the second highest
frequency response (DoD Acceptance and Inspection Procedures).
" The following barrier appeared in the Barrier Identification (Table 4-1), but
did not appear in the Top 5 ranking: Industrial Base Concerns
4. Top 2 Barrier Rankings
Continuing to narrow the significance of barriers as perceived by the
respondents, the Top 2 Barrier Rankings are presented in Table 4-4.
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OTHER BARRIERS
Barriers related to UNI)ERSTANI)ING or
EDUCATION regarding'l'QM principles Frequency
CONTRACTUAL REQUIREMENTS FOR TQM 1
DIFFICULTY IN MEASURING SOME GOVERNMENT OUTPUTS I
PERCETI'ION TIIAT QUALITY COSTS $j 1
EASiER TO GO BY TIlE BOOK 1
MANAGEMENT DOES NOT REALLY BELIEVE IN TQM
-JUSTA NEW TREND 1
COOPERA 77ON BETWEEN FUNCTIONA , AREAS 1
EDUCATION - NOT TIlE SAME AS TRAINING 1
PRODUCT VS. PROCESS ORIENTATION 1
LACK OF SENIOR LEADERSHIP 1
UNDERSTANDING 1
U.S. ELEMENTAR Y AND SECONDAR Y SCIIOOL1 SYSTEMS I
Barriers related to THAI)ITIONAL MANAGEM ENT
or C U LI'U RAL practices regardin 'TQM principles Frequency
UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT RISK 2
CONSTANCY OF PURPOSE TIIROUGIIOUT 2




IHUGb SIZE Ob' I)OD & INI)USTR Y I
TAMPERING B1Y MANAGEMENT I
MERIT PAY I
U,;,'ICULTY IN FINDING A DECISION MAKER I
OVER COMPENSATION OF IIGH LEVEL EXECUTI VES (INDUSTR Y) I
LABOR NOT TREA TED AS FIXED COSTS (WAGES NOT LINKED
TO SUCCESS OF COMPANY) I
BIDDING SYSTEM I
EVALUATION METIIODS ON PERFORMANCE OF MANAGEMENT I
RIGID CHAIN OF COMMAND STRUCTURF I
POOR ENVIRONMENT (FEAR, SHOOT TIE MESSENGER, CYA) I
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY I
SHORT TERM VS. LONG TERM VISION I
MIL STDS 2000 AND 1567 1
NUMBER AND COMPLEXITY OFGO VERNMENT AUDITS I
WORKER SKEI7CISM ]
DETAILED ACQUISITION REGULATIONS 1
EGO 1
BUREAUCRACY OR BUREA UCRATIC BEIJIA VIOR 1
SUB-OPTIMIZATION VS. OPTIMIZATION I
TABLE 4-2
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TOP 5 BARRIER RANKINGS
rop 5 Barrier Ranking EXPI'ERT VF SF OT
1 Managnient Willingness toChange 11 12 4 27
4 Dol) Acceptance and Inspection Procedures 8 7 1 16
12 Congressional Oversight 5 8 2 15
2 Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 8 3 3 14
9 Training 6 7 0 13
5 l)oD Specilications 4 6 1 1
13 Single Year Budgeting 3 3 2 8
14 Management Mobility 3 3 1 7
7 Contractor Cost Recovery Systems 3 2 1 6
8 Ethics 1 2 1 4
tO Socio-Economic Programs 1 1 1 3
11 Industry Labor Unions 2 1 0 3
3 Buy American 0 1 0 1
iS OMBCircular A-109 0 1 0 1
6 Industrial Base Concerns 0 0 0 0
Other Barriers 9 15 3 27
TABLE 4-3
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a. Table 4-4 Synopsis
" Not included in the Top 2 Barrier Rankings (0 frequency) were Industrial
Base Concerns, Buy A merican, and Contractor Cost Recovery Systems.
" Training, DoD Specifications, Socto-Economic Programs, Management
Mobility, OMB Circular A-109, Ethics, Industrial Base Concerns, Buy
American, and Contractor Cost Recovery Systems were all excluded from the
Top 2 Barrier Ranking by all Experts.
* Management Willingness to Change was ranked roughly double in
significance than the three closest barriers (CICA, Congressional Oversight,
and DoD Acceptance and Inspection Procedures).
" The following barriers appeared in the Top 5 Barrier Ranking (Table 4-3), but
did not appear in the Top 2 ranking: Buy American
Contractor Cost Recovery Systems
5. Top I Barrier Rankings
Table 4-5 represents the frequency that barriers were indicated by
respondents to be the most significant impediments to fully implementing TQM in
the DoD Acquisition System. Table 4-5 specifically delineates the category "Other
Barriers", in order to fairly present the respondents' Top I barriers.
a. Table 4-5 Synopsis
" Management Willingness to Change again doubles the respondents assigned
significance of the nearest other barriers.
" Each of the Other-Barriers is a management related statement. Therefore
even a greater emphasis on Management Willingness to Change could be
inferred.
" CICA is delineated by respondents as the second most significant
impediment. Whereas in the Top 2 Barrier Rankings (Table 4-4), CICA and
Congressional Oversight were perceived nearly equal by respondents.
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TOP 2 BARRIER RANKINGS
'Top 2 Barrier Rankin EXPERT VF SF TOT
1 Management Willingness to Change 6 7 4 17
2 Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 5 3 0 8
12 Congressional Oversight 3 4 1 8
4 i)ol) Acceptance and Inspection Procedures 3 4 0 7
13 Single Year Budgeting 2 1 0 3
9 'raining 0 2 0 2
1! 1ndustry Labor Unions 1 0 0 1
5 DoD Specifications 0 1 0 1
10 Socio-Economic Programs 0 1 0 1
14 Management Mobility 0 1 0 1
"5 OMB Circular A-109 0 1 0 1
8 Ethics 0 0 1 1
6 Industrial Base Concerns 0 0 0 0
3 Buy American 0 0 0 0
7 Contractor Cost Recovery Systems 0 0 0 0
Other Barriers 5 6 2 13
TABLE 4-4
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* The following barriers appeared in the Top 2 Barrier Ranking (Table 4-4), but




OMB Circular A -109
6. I)ol) Internal vs. External Control Barriers
Respondents were requested in Section II of the survey to provide their
perception of barrier(s), as to whether the barrier was due to one of three
categories: Government Law or Regulation (GLR), Internal Policy (1P), or Neither
(N). Table 4-6 represents the cumulative frequency that each barrier obtained
from the respondents regarding this objective. 'Fable 4-6 is listed in ascending
order, starting with barriers with the highest level of perceived GLR, down to IP.
a. Table 4-6 Synopsis
* Table 4-6 indicates that the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 is the
barrier regarded as the most difficult barrier for DoD to eliminate or
effectively neutralize from within.
" Single Year Budgeting, Socio-Economic Programs, and Congressional
Oversight, are respectively regarded as barriers that DoD has little internal
control over effecting change.
" Buy American, OMB Circular A-109, Contractor Cost Recovery Systems, DoD
Specifications, and DoD Acceptance and Inspection Procedures, reflect
barriers regarded as very difficult for DoD to overcome internally, but it is
possible.
" Industrial Base Concerns, Ethics, Training, Management Mobility, and
Industry Labor Unions reflect barriers that DoD can exert considerable
control over influencing change to reduce the effects of these barriers.




'Top I Barrier [tanking EXiERT VF SF T0T
1 Management Willingness to Change 4 5 3 12
2 Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 3 2 0 5
12 Congressional Oversight 2 1 1 4
4 DoD Acceptance and Inspection Procedures 1 2 0 3
13 Single Year Budgeting 1 0 0 1
14 Management Mobility 1 1 0 2
*Other Barriers 2 5 0 7
*Other Category 'op I Barriers:
Expert: CONSTANCY OF PURPOS TIIROUGIOUT
Expert: LEADERSIIIP
Very Familiar: FEAR OF TAKING ON PERSONAL RISK
Very Familiar: LACK OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT FOCUS AT TO
Very Familiar: EGO
Very Familiar: TOTAL COMMITMENT I Y ALL OF MANAGEMENT
Very Familiar: GOVERNMEN' ACCOUNI'A Il,I'Y (defining the product
and holding government managers accountable is difficult)
TABLE 4-5
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IN I ERNAL VS. EXI ERNAL (.UN I KUL UV-K BAKIIKI
Frequency
Type of I mpediment GLR IP N
2 Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 21 3 0
13 Single Year Budgeting 21 4 1
10 Socio-Econoinic Programs 20 3 1
12 Congressional Oversight 16 5 5
3 Buy American 13 2 1
15 OMB Circular A-109 12 5 0
7 Contractor Cost Recovery Systems 12 7 1
5 DoD Specifications 12 12 1
4 DoD Acceptance and Inspection Procedures I1 16 2
6 Industrial Base Concerns 8 7 5
8 Ethics 6 5 8
9 Training 3 11 10
1 Management Willingness to Change 3 4 21
14 Management Mobility 2 12 8
1 1 Industry Labor Unions 1 7 12
Note:
GLR = Government Law or Regulation
IP = Internal f'olicy
N = Neither
TABLE 4-6 This Table represents the respondent's opinion regarding the amount of internal
or external control DoD can exert to overcome each barrier. Those barriers at thetop exhibit the
least amount of internal control available to DoD Likewise those barriers towards the bottom
exhibit greater internal capacity to decrase the significance of the barrier.
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7. Top I Barriers - Internal vs. External Control
Table 4-7 is similar to Table 4-6 except that it applies only to the Top I
barriers as ranked by the respondents (see Top I barriers in Table 4-5). Table 4-7
represents the degree of internal control the DoD has over these most significant
barriers. The barriers are listed in ascending order, starting with barriers with
the highest level of perceived GLR.
a. Table 4-7 Synopsis
o Table 4-7 indicates that Management Willingness to Change, is the barrier
that DoD has the most internal influence over lessening its impedance.
o The respondents perceive CICA, Single Year Budgeting, Socio-Economic
Programs, and Congressional Oversight as the barriers that DoD has the least
internal ability to change
C. SUMMARY
The questionnaire results were successful in determining the perceived
barriers impeding implementation of TQM in the acquisition process. The
researcher specifically requested ranking of fifteen potential barriers. Table 4-1
provides the outcome. It is noted that the results of the Top 5 and Top 1 barrier did
not fall in the same relative ranking order in each of the Tables. Management
Willingness to Change remained at the top of every ranking, making it clearly the
most significant barrier indicated by the respondents.
The ranking of the fifteen potential barriers, and to what extent the DoD has
ability to internally manage change for those elements, may be crucial in deciding
which barriers to attempt to overcome soonest.
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TOP 1 BARRIERS - INTERNAL VS. EXTERNAL CONTROL
FREQU ENCY
Typ~eof I medimni(Tou I Harriersi G LI If, N
2 Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 21 3 0
'~Single Year Budgeting 21 41
12 Congressional Oversight 16 55
4 Dol. Acceptance and Inspection Procedures 11 16 2
14 Management Mobility 2 12 8
Management Willingness to Change 3 4 21
Note:







Deming contends that the most important losses to a system are
unmeasurable and unknowable. It would be difficult to measure the losses in
dollars, worker joy, and customer satisfaction that result from the barriers
analyzed in this chapter. Deming challenges management, however, saying that
these unmeasurable and unknowable losses are the very ones that we must
manage. He states, "It is nonsense to say that if you can't measure it, you can't
manage it"(Ref. 11].
The objective of this chapter is to analyze the six barriers presented in Table
4-5 (Top I Barriers), in order to gain an understanding of the nature of these
barriers, the extent to which DoD can internally make changes to reduce or
eliminate the barriers, and appropriate action(s) which could effect overcoming the
barriers.
The analysis includes the researcher's subject grouping of the respondent's
characterization of each barrier and proposed actions to overcome the barrier. An
analysis of the responses by subject element identifies the similarities and
differences concerning each barrier.
B. MANAGEMENTWILLINGNESS TO CHANGE
It is evident from the data obtained in this research that Management
WtIlingness to Change is perceived as the greatest barrier to implementing TQM in
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the DoD acquisition system. Table 4-5 indicates that the degree of significance of
this barrier overwhelms the other closest barriers (see also Figure 5-1).




A Management Willingness to Change
B CICA 10-
C Congressional Oversight
D DoD Acceptance & Inspection Procedures 5
E Single Year Budgeting
F Management Mobility
0
A B C D E F
Figure 5-1 This figure shows the Top 1 Barriers and their relative significance as barriers. For
instance, the barrier Management Willingness to Change is viewed as the most significant, and is
more than double the obstacle than the next closest barrier.
The following characteristics of the barrier Management Willingness to
Change were derived from the comments provided by Expert, Very Familiar, and
Somewhat Familiar respondents respectively. The purpose is to summarize the
barrier into subcategories to better determine its perceived elements. These
categories are not presented in order of precedence. The verbatim comments of
Expert respondents regarding Management Willingness to Change are contained in
Appendix B.
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I. Characterization by Expert Respondents
The characteristic elements of this barrier as described by expert
respondents, as well as how the barrier might be overcome, are summarized as
follows:
a. Commitment
Characterized as an unwillingness by management to make
decisions or to place personal reputation subordinate to the long run good of the
Government. Management's actions are not linked with rhetoric concerning TQM.
Overcome by: Respondents recommended that directives forcing
change be implemented (directives that have "teeth"). Also proposed were,
increased training, implementation of organizational management systems that
identify the costs of unquality and backing up rhetoric with resources.
b. Management Sees No Need to Change
Managers have been judged successful, rewarded, and promoted
under a certain system and see no requirement to change. U.S. managers still
believe they are inherently superior.
Overcome by: Respondents stated that education and patience are
required to aid management in seeing the need to change. Respondents also
indicated that peer and supervisor influence will also be a factor in convincing
management of the need for change. Otherwise, only threats to an organization's
survival will force management to change.
c. Environment
Employees do not see that the environment has changed because
they do not see management living-out ''QM.
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Overcome by: Employees must see management's conversion and
actions that support the numerous written mandates to implement TQM.
Management must create a holistic approach to improvement by considering the
effects of their actions on the entire system prior to making changes.
d. Communication
There is the perception that the more information or- ,as (as an
individual or an organization), the more important one becomes. This tends to
inhibit communication rather than encourage it, which is so necessary to effect
continuous improvement.
Overcome by Strive to change the culture to one of cooperation vice
competition.
e. Leadership
This element is characterized as a lack of constancy of purpose.
Also, management's reluctance to commit to TQM is a result of the perception that
it is a threat to their operations. Management is unwilling to give up any control.
Overcome by: Leaders must provide a positive environment for
value added efforts through cultivation of a holistic and creative approach to
improving processes.
2. Characterization by Very Familiar Respondents
a. Leadership
This element indicates that there is a fear of taking personal risks;
the current process is understood and change is uncomfortable. Also, cultural
changes will not occur if leaders do not follow through on their commitment to
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TQM. Another element is that managers are reluctant to ask for help inasmuch as
it is a sign of weakness and represents relinquishment of autonomous authority.
Overcome by: Incentives and rewards need to be structured that
foster the use of TQM principles in acquisition management. Commitment from
the President and Congress (and on down) is required for successful TQM
implementation. Managers must be taught to be coaches, and must not demand
quick results from TQM efforts.
b. Management Sees No Need to Change
Promotions are based on traditional management approaches;
therefore management sees no need to change.
Overcome by: The respondents indicated that training is essential
to influencing change in those individuals who were judged successful under the
old management style.
c. Commitment
. The respondents indicated that management does not believe in
TQM, despite many "motherhood" statements. Their actions do not indicate
commitment to TQM. This is referred to as paying "lip service" to TQM.
Commitment from top management is necessary; however, determining who is top
management in DoD is difficult.
Overcome by: The respondents suggest making organizational
changes to back up motherhood statements about TQM. They also indicated that
continuous training must be utilized to overcome this barrier, and if training does
not influence willingness to change, then removal from position(s) of authority will
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be necessary. Lastly, respondents indicated that consensus between Congress and
the DoD regarding resources and regulations would aid in overcoming this barrier.
d. Environment
Top management must act as role models and ensure that all
employees understand the importance that TQM has in the fabric of the enterprise.
Respondents indicated that managers feel that TQM will cause them to lose
control of their "rice bowl(s)".
Overcome by: Management must provide evidence that TQM and
process change are essential to improvement; management and labor must become
mutually benefiting stakeholders. Also, managers must become team facilitators
in solving problems, and possess a thorough understanding of SPC and control
charts. Respondents also stated that only management training compatible with
TQM should be supported.
e. Lacking Incentives to Change
Those depicting this element said that a business-as-usual attitude
is prevalent for both management and labor, and neither trusts each other.
Overcome by: The industry side of the DoD acquisition system
should treat labor as a fixed cost in order to build trust between management and
labor.
3. Characterization by Somewhat Familiar Respondents
a. Commitment
Respondents claim that top management has a "me-first" or "my
boss first", short-term attitude. TQM must be accepted by top level management
prior to the expectation that cultural changes will take place. They point out that
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commitment and dedication to staying the course is difficult for top management
due to pressure from above (short term performance goals).
Overcome by: To overcome the barrier, respondents stated that
short-term goals must be traded with long-term goals; reward those who have a
long range, vice short range vision. This should be tempered by a realization that
those who were successful under the status quo will be extremely resistant to
change. Commitment by top management must be visible and unwavering;
educate a critical mass of key leaders who will get involved with disciplined
process improvement methods.
b. Environment
Respondents stated that the climate necessary to foster TQM, is
created by top management. If the proper environment is not created, TQM will
become another "ility".
Overcome by: Training personnel, and applying what is learned is
proposed as a solution to creating the TQM environment.
c. UnderstandingTQM
This element indicates that management sees their "managerial
rights" challenged by some of the "mysterious" aspects of TQM. Management is
afraid to totally commit to TQM. Furthermore, there is also the factor of human
nature and the resistance to change that is normally experienced.
Overcome by: Top management must be exposed and trained
regarding TQM. Also, a strong visible commitment by the very top management
must work its way down through the ranks to the working level.
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4. Analysis of the Characteristics
The perception by the respondents that Management VIllingness to
Change is by far the most significant barrier, indicates that the leadership
transformation needed for TQM to flourish has not yet been accomplished.
Deming's admonition that a high majority of the problems in any system
are problems that only management can solve is particularly apropos' in light of
the significance of this barrier as depicted in this study. When management
grasps the cultural change, understands, and internalizes the implications of that
statement, perhaps Management Willingness to Change can be reduced in its
significance as a barrier to TQM. The shift to TQM thinking has begun within
DoD; however, it will take a significant amount of time for management's current
view of the acquisition system to change. Perhaps 10 to 15 years will pass before
the transformation has actually occurred [8:p. 149-1551. Maintaining the
constancy of purpose necessary to effect the change will be difficult. One author
summarizes management's responsibility in this matter by stating that:
Only top management can establish the constancy of purpose necessary to
know and then to meet the customers' needs and expectations. Only they can
make policy, establish the set of core values, or set the long-term course for the
corporation. Many companies do have policy statements that reflect top
management's vision. But it is easy for the folks on the top floor to get
religion. Talk is cheap. Top management might be able to set the course, but
may never realize that it is also their responsibility to provide a road map so
that the rest of the organization may follow [Ref. 17:p. 111.
In expressing management's responsibility with regard to TQM, Expert,
Very Familiar (VF), and Somewhat Familiar (SF) respondents all indicated that
Management Willingness to Change has Environment and Commitment as critical
elements. All three groups agreed that top management creates the environment
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or conditions for TQM implementation. Every group indicated that top
management must "live-out" TQM, and act as role models influencing the course
that their subordinates will take. Experts said that the environment has not
changed so as to create an open climate where the workforce perceives the change
and can embrace TQM concepts. rhe results of top management's failure to create
that climate, is a lack of acceptance for TQM concepts by the workforce. One SF
respondent pointed out that TQM is in danger of becoining an "ility" , or a buzz
word. The researcher's experience in the student environment is that TQM is
already a negatively approached buzz word, and it takes top management's
(professors in the researcher's case) to create the climate where people can get past
the negative connotations that another new program faces. Even after exposure,
some will remain against it, solely because they view it as another way that
management is using to get people to do what management wants them to do.
To overcome the environmental aspect of this barrier, respondents all
focused on what should be done by top management to create a TQM environment.
Experts, VF, and SF all believe that such an environme 't is not established
without presentation of evidence of TQM's positive results, and subsequent action
to apply TQM. All indicated that management is responsible for providing the
proof that TQM can work in the organization. Only Experts indicated that the
environment is created as top management holistically lives-out the quality
process on a philosophical and practical level. VF and SF solutions were practical
in nature, e.g., management and the workforce must agree to be stakeholders with
one another, top management must act as facilitators, understand SPC, and only
provide management training that is compatible with TQM.
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The commitment element of this barrier was characterized by all
respondents as: top management does not believe in TQM. They said that top
management pays "lip service" to TQM and has not changed from seeking short
term personal gains over the long run good of the organization. To overcome the
commitment element of Management WillLngness to Change, the Expert
respondents focused on how management can demonstrate commitment, not how
to help management become committed. rhe Experts said that directives of
substance, quality measuring systems, and directed resources would improve the
perceived level of management's commitment. VF and SF focused on how to make
management committed to TQM, e.g., make organizational changes, promote and
reward managers based on TQM objectives vice short-term results, and develop a
critical mass of top management who are committed and act as examples to their
peers.
The element, Management Sees No Need to Change, had Expert and VF
respondent comments. They indicate that top management was promoted in the
past based on traditional management approaches and apparently see no present
link between TQM and future promotions. The respondents point out that in the
past, organizations and the managers were viewed as successful. Experts stated
that this is a phenomenon whereby U.S. managers still believe that they are
inherently better managers. To overcome this element, both Expert and VF
respondents recommended concentrating on education of top management with
regard to TQM concepts. Experts also stated that peer and supervisor influence is
needed to gain the trust of those who do not see the need to change. They said that
this should be tempered with patience.
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Leadership, was also cited by Expert and VF respondents as one element
of Management Willingness to Change. Both groups indicated that DoD managers
exhibit a high degree of autonomous behavior, i.e., they claimed that DoD
managers are independent by nature. The respondents said that managers are
groomed to think that a request for assistance is a sign of weakness in a leader.
Experts viewed this as a fear by management to take risks by relinquishing some
control to the workforce. VF respondents pointed out that lack of leadership
induces a lack of constancy of purpose throughout the organization.
Experts attributed to the element of communication, a lack of holistic
thinking by managers. Managers view information flow as something that must
be controlled inasmuch as information is power. They hold back information that
might otherwise help the organization, or a peer, in order to use that information
as personally benefits them the most. No group commented on the communication
between management and the workforce that is an integral part of TQM. The
focus was on the independent nature of DoD managers. To overcome this barrier,
Expert respondents indicated that a culture of cooperation, not competition must
be fostered by top management.
The group, SF, pointed out that many managers view some aspects of
TQM as "mysterious". In order to overcome this element it is necessary that top
management fully understand the essential elements of TQM, otherwise
significant levels of cominitment will not be achieved. This perception, that TQM
holds some mysterious truths is critical to overcome. Deming explains that it as
appreciation for a system, theory of variation, theory of knowledge, and
psychology.
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5. Summary of the Barrier, Management Willingness to Change
The respondents brought forth many elements to the characterization of
this barrier. Among the headlines were the following: Management's
unwillingness to commit to transformation creates a lack of constancy of purpose
for the organization. Transformation, or commitment to the new culture is viewed
as risky by some top managers who are skeptical of new programs or view TQM as
a threat to traditional management approaches. Employees do not see that the
environment has changed primarily because they do not see management living-
out the TQM philosophy. The competitive environment still prevails over the
cooperative environment. The prevailing environment is the one in which
managers have been judged successful and promoted, and now see no requirement
to change, especially when control mechanisms have not changed to incentivize
changes in management behavior. Other control measures such as measuring
systems to determine the costs of poor quality are lacking. Part of the reason that
TQM is resisted is because U.S. managers still believe they are inherently superior
to managers from other cultures. U.S. managers think that control systems are set
in place to give guidance to lower level management so lower management can run
the show. TQM says that top management must become stakeholders together
with the workforce. This superiority mentality, along with management's
unwillingness to place personal reputation subordinate to the long rur good of the
organization is detrimental to the TQM environment.
Following analysis of the respondents' comments, the elements below
are presented as a guidelines for leading a TQM effort (assumes that the leader
has a base of profound knowledge):
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" Understand the "mysterious" aspects of TQM and be able to explain them
(profound knowledge).
" Provide a positive environment for value added efforts.
" Cultivate a culture of cooperation vice competition.
" Live out TQM by personal example.
" Foster holistic and creative approaches to improving processes.
" Provide examples and evidence that TQM is working.
" Become a stakeholder with the workforce for the success of the organization.
" Facilitate TQM. Become a coach.
" Apply TQM principles (apply head knowledge).
" Lose your "business as usual" approach to improvement.
" Publish long run organizational goals that commit resources (link TQM to
the organization's business plan).
" Measure improvement.
" Make your commitment to TQM visible to the workforce.
" Develop a critical mass of TQM proponents.
" Incentivize people to apply TQM.
" Link promotions and rewards to TQM vice short term goals.
" Make organizational changes when there are barriers to TQM.
" Ensure all directives clearly come under the TQM umbrella.
" Build internal and external political consensus for TQM approaches.
" Build trust with the workforce by commitment to provide jobs.
" Be patient.
" Influence peers and superiors alike.
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C. COMI'E'1'ITION IN CON'I'RAC'I'ING AC'I' OF 1984
The Competition i Contracting Act of 1984 is ranked as the number two most
significant barrier blocking implementation of TQM in the DoD acquisition
system. With regard to the level of difficulty the DoD would possibly face trying to
internally reduce this barrier, the respondents perceived the barrier as the most
difficult (see Figure 5-2) to effect change internally.
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igure 5-2 shows the respondents' perception regarding the degree of internal control that DoD
has over the barrier. For instance, to overcome CICA, perhaps statute would have to be modified.
Whereas to overcome Management Willingness to Change, relatively fewer statutes or regulations
act as obstacles in overcoming the barrier.
The following barrier characterizations are derived from the comments
provided by Expert, Very Familiar, and Somewhat Familiar respondents
respectively. The purpose is to summarize this barrier into subcategories to better
determine its perceived elements. These categories are not intended to be
presented in any order of precedence. The verbatim comments of Expert
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respondents regarding the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 are contained in
Appendix C.
I. Characterization by Expert Respondents
a. Multiple Sources Duplicates Resource Spending
One respondent claimed that competition within the same industry
leads to the waste of scarce resources due to duplicated research (without
coordination between companies). This respondent also stated that bidding, and
price cutting guarantees lesser quality products will be received.
Overcome by: The respondent recommended revising antitrust
laws to allow greater cooperation within industries.
b. Perpetuates Poor Quality Sources
Development of long term relationships with quality suppliers is
hindered by CICA. The requirement for multiple sources fosters carrying poor
quality suppliers in the DoD acquisition system.
Overcome by: Amend CICA to allow for purchase of quality over
price. Stop internal policies that make CICA more restrictive than the law
requires.
c. Low Bidder Mentality
Respondents indicated that the requirement to award to the low
bidder destroys attempts to foster long term relationships with suppliers.
Furthermore, the respondents said that adversarial relationships are the result of
the low bidder mentality.
Overcome by: The respondent claims that education is a partial
means by which the barrier might be overcome. CICA should be amended to allow
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for long term relationships with suppliers. Also, awarding contracts based on the
long run price, as well as quality, will assist in overcoming the barrier.
d. Inflexible
With CICA in place, there is little that can be done to foster TQM-
like buyer and supplier relationships. Attempts to improve quality of suppliers,
and comply with CICA. have not provided positive results.
Overcome by: Amend CICA to allow better quality suppliers long
term relationships with the Government.
2. Characterization by Very Familiar Respondents
a. Emphasis on Price
CICA does not encourage quality to become part of the acquisition
equation. There is no opportunity to rate and select quality over competitive price.
The idea that the Government is only trying to meet its minimum needs places a
low emphasis on the quality of supplies or services received.
Overcome by: The source selection process should rate quality.
Apply greater emphasis on prevention of poor quality as opposed to lowest cost.
b. Does Not Allow Long Term Buyer-Supplier Relationships
This respondent refers to DoD's inability to implement Deming's
point number four, which encourages a limited supplier base of quality suppliers
with whom long term relationships are maintained in order to minimize costs.
Overcome by: The respondent recommends repeal of CICA and the
elimination of competition advocate positions. Obtaining good contractors would
still involve competition, but a long term relationship would be possible.
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3. Characterization by Somewhat Familiar Respondents
There were no comments by Somewhat Familiar respondents concerning
the barrier, CICA. This is reflected in Table 4-5, Top I Barrier Rankings.
4. Analysis of the Characteristics
Deming claims that we are in a new economic age. What does that
mean? lie claims that we have "been sold down the river" by the economic theory
of salvation by competition in the market place. Sold down the river? Did nut
competitive style capitalism influence the end of the Cold War?
In his seminar, Deming discussed the failing of communism. He claimed
that communism did not fail due to the lack of the attributes that capitalism has,
but rather they did not understand the concept of customer driven quality. "They
have no idea (concept) of a customer. They take what they get. Five, six, seven
years to obtain an automobile. A market driven economy serves the customer.
They never had it." [Ref. Ill
The new economic age that Deming speaks of is one of cooperation, not
competition. Deming states that discounts on prices force other companies to lower
their prices. "Sounds good", he says, but in fact, oscillation in prices and varying
sources (awarding one time to one supplier, and another time to a different
supplier), takes you further and further from your desires as a customer [Ref. 111
and [Ref 8:p. 327-334]. Expert respondents in this thesis research indicate that
DoD's competitive bidding system is not one of cooperation, in fact, they contend
that the system guarantees low quality deliveries, and causes adversarial
relationships with suppliers.
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Findings of the 1989 U.S. Department of Defense Technology
Assessment Team on Japanese Manufacturing Technology also confirm that
cooperation is not the norm in the DoD acquisition system:
The Japanese experience contrasts with that found in the United States,
particularly with major DoD manufacturers, where prime contractors
communicate with detailed specifications, seek the lowest available price,
often to the exclusion of other factors, and encourage intense, even cutthroat
competition among vendors for short-term contracts. That results in an
unstable vendor community in which ' he benefits of a long-term relationship
do not accrue and where the expertise of the vendor has little opportunity to
affect product design or production. [Ref. 3:p. 621
Both Expert and VF respondents pointed out that CICA fosters
competitive short term buyer-supplier relationships. Ford Motor Company had a
similar problem, so they initiated an effort to bring about the benefits that could be
derived from long-term contract relationships, i.e., minimize costs to the system.
Mr. L. M. Chicoine, Vice President for Purchasing, was evaluating the progress
Ford had made in establishing this new long-term (greater than one year) policy,
and found that there had been no appreciable increase in longer term contracts six
months after implementation of the initiative. Ford found that the one barrier
blocking increase to the number of long-term contracts was a requirement that
purchasing officials obtain approval (through two levels of supervision) for
contracts written for greater than one year. To break down that barrier, a one
word change in policy reversed the trend. Ford made it necessary for purchasing
officials to obtain approval to write contracts for less than one year. No
improvement was achieved until management changed the system. [Ref. 17:p. 131-
21
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This fundamental change to Ford's purchasing system fostered long term
relationships with suppliers. It is interesting to note that one Expert respondent
characterized CICA as being inflexible (like Ford's original purchasing system).
This respondent had experience in trying to improve the quality of suppliers, but
there was little that could be done because of CICA. Likewise, the highly regarded
expert, Dr. Yoshida, stated to the researcher that the "...number one priority (for
DoD) should be establishing long term relationships with suppliers" [Ref. 181.
Another TQM expert observes:
Unsuccessful total quality management will fail to distinguish between
suppliers. The unsuccessful will not develop relationships with critical
suppliers, will not develop incentives for improved supplier quality, will not
differentiate in the inspections and controls required with different suppliers,
and--admittedly hampered by government regulations--will provide the same
profits to their best and worst suppliers. [Ref. 19:p. 6 7 1
In order to overcome the short-term buyer-supplier relationship element of CICA,
both Expert and VF respondents stated that the law should be amended to allow
for longer-term relationships. Surprisingly, no respondent indicated that greater
use of multiyear contracting would better foster long term relationships. The 1991
National Defense Authorization Act has taken some measures to reduce some of
the requirement for use of multiyear contracts. [Ref: 2 0 :p. 35]
Regarding the emphasis that CICA places on price, a 1989 Joint OSD-
Air Force-Industry study on TQM impediments confirmed that it is the
Government's practice to require all individual procurement actions to be awarded
on the basis of full and open competition (with few exceptions). The report went on
to say that CICA proliferates bidding for Government contracts, thereby adding
significant "non-value-added" costs (unquantifiable costs) to the acquisition
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system. The Expert and VF respondents also conveyed that the low bidder
mentality to obtain the Government's "minimum" needs, does not minimize costs
in the long run. They point out that "minimum" needs is DoD's current buying
culture. The quality culture has not yet penetrated Dol)'s buying practices.
Some of the non-value costs added by CICA involve the award protest
system. Protests were not specifically mentioned by any respondent group as
being an element of the nature of this barrier; however, Expert respondents do
portray CICA as being cause for adversarial relationships between the
Government and defense contractors.
Along the same lines, the OSD-Air Force-Industry study claims that
increased use of TQM selection criteria will result in an increase in protests, and
that the protest system may be a subset barrier of CICA [Ref. 2:p. 17]. Therefore,
amending CICA to allow for quality measures in source selection criteria will not
eliminate the protest problem, and in fact may add even greater non-value added
costs to the buying process. This would be tantamount to Ford's first attempt at
solving the quality supplier problem. The Expert and VF respondents also
characterize the CICA barrier as perpetuating poor quality suppliers; that source
selection should factor in quality, but cannot under CICA. One acquisition expert
commented of CICA:
...there is no place where seeking competition is coupled with objectives of
cost savings, innovation, schedule benefits, or economy and efficiency. One
must, therefore be concerned that the statute will encourage competition for
competition's sake, regardless of other effects. [21:p. 134]
Expert respondents also indicated that in order to overcome CICA as a
barrier to TQM, the Competition Advocates in the Services should be
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disestablished. The Joint OSD-Air Force-Industry study likewise portends that
DoD's use of Competition Advocates to increase the supplier base and promote
competition, often runs counter to TQM objectives (Ref. 2:p. 17]. The OSD-Air
Force-Industry study (like the respondents in this research) recommended
amendment of CICA to make the law consistent with TQM principles.
It is perhaps relevant to comment on the DoD's industrial base at this
point because often the rationale for competition is based on the belief that DoD's
industrial base will be generally healthier by having more suppliers. None of the
respondents linked industrial base concerns with CICA; however, the
characterization of CICA as being inflexible was one of CICA's elements as
previously mentioned. The findings of the DoD Technology Assessment Team on
Japanese Manufacturing Technology point out that while Japanese firms have
fewer suppliers (long-term relationships), their system of subcontracting allows
prime contractors greater flexibility to respond to changing marke tnd changing
demands [Ref. 3:p. xx]. In the DoD acquisition system, prime contractors deal
directly with many suppliers, whereas Japanese prime contractors (albeit the
reference is to private industry), deal directly with only a few primary
subcontractors. Likewise, Japanese primary subcontractors then deal directly
with a few secondary subcontractors in a relationship based on a long-term
commitment, high performance, and quality in addition to price [Ref. 3:p. xx]. This
point is brought forth by the researcher to point out that the argument that
competition is beneficial to the industrial base, may not be self-evident. This is
reflected in the low ranking the respondents attributed to the barrier Industrial
Base Concerns (see Table 4-1).
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Finally, one Expert respondent remarked concerning the duplicative
expenditure of resources that occurs due to the competitive versus cooperative
nature of the DoD acquisition system as it pertains to research. This respondent,
like Deming, criticizes U.S. antitrust laws which preclude companies in the same
industry from cooperating with one another regarding research [Ref. 8 :p. 1521.
5. Summary of the Barrier, Competition In Contracting Act of 1984
Experts ranked CICA as a inure significant barrier than any other
respondent group. Both the Expert and Very Familiar respondents indicated that
the law should be modified or repealed in order to foster longer term relationships
with contractors and higher quality, process oriented products. One Expert
respondent went beyond the scope of CICA and recommended that Antitrust laws
be amended to allow for greater cooperation in the research stages of product
development. Both Expert and Very Familiar respondents indicated that CICA
does not target the quality of items received, but rather strictly focuses on price
competition.
Following analysis, these elements were adopted from Expert, VF, and
SF respondents and are synopsized below as potential solutions to overcoming the
barrier, CICA:
" Amend CICA to allow for purchase of quality (make quality a part of source
selection criteria), and long term relationships with suppliers.
" Award on total minimum cost to the system.
" Stop internal policies that make CICA more restrictive than necessary.
" Have competition, but make the buyer-supplier relationship longer term.
" Disestablish competition advocate positions within the services.
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* Amend antitrust laws.
1). CONGRESSIONALOVERSIGHT
Congressional Oversight, viewed by respondents as the third most significant
Top 1 Barrier (Table 4-5), is also perceived by respondents to be relatively difficult
to overcome internally (Figure 5-2 refers).
The following barrier characterizations are derived from the comments
provided by Expert, Very Familiar, and Somewhat Familiar respondents
respectively. The purpose is to summarize the barrier into subcategories to better
determine its perceived elements. These characterizations are not presented in
order of precedence. rhe Verbatim comments of Expert respondents regarding
Congressional Oversight are contained in Appendix D.
I. Characterization by Expert Respondents
a. DoD Track Record Fosters Congressional Micromanagement
Congress is partially justified in its oversight of the DoD acquisition
system due to cost-overruns and Ill Wind type incidents. Furthermore, it is
unlikely that Congressional Oversight will decrease.
Overcome by: DoD and contractors must be more open to disclosing
unfavorable information to Congress. Both DoD and defense contractors must
perform better in applied business judgment, and ethically, in order to increase the
trust of Congress.
b. Political Incentives Conflict with TQM
A politician's incentive for vote seeking is greater than a politician's
incentive to look at the holistic improvement of the system.
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Overcome by: Educate Congress and the public regarding the need
to reject current acquisition system buying practices which foster short term
relationships with poor quality suppliers.
c. Congressional Action Greatly Influences the Acquisition System
Major changes cannot be made to the acquisition process without the
support of key people in Congress (staff and Congressional members).
Overcome by: This can be accomplished by obtaining the backing of
key Congressional members to assist in structuring the acquisition system to be in
line with TQM concepts. DoD must aid in increasing Congress' understanding of
total quality approaches.
2. Characterization by Very Familiar Respondents
a. DoD Acquisition System is Often Politicized by Congress
Congress must recognize that it does not make good business sense
to use the defense acquisition system to promote political social agendas.
Overcome by: Educate Congress that political and social agendas
often produce poor business decisions.
b. Political Incentives Conflict with TQM
',rie vote seeking nature of politicians is incompatible with TQM; too
many decisions regarding the defense acquisition system are made based on
politics vice sound business judgment.
Overcome: Respondents stated that there is no way to overcome this
barrier, therefore TQM will be very difficult to apply within the Government.
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c. Excessive Oversight Discourages Decision Making
Excessive oversight creates a "bunker" mentality within DoD;
"everyone pulls their steel pot down over their toes". This mentality creates the
barrier Management Willingness to Change, and discourages creative decision
making due to management's fear of punishment.
Overcome by: No comments were provided.
3. Characterization by Somewhat Familiar Respondents
a. Detailed Statutes Complicate and Slow the Acquisition Process
Detailed procurement statutes are statements of mistrust by
Congress (mistrust of DoD acquisition officials).
Overcome by: DoD should ensure that Congress and congressional
staff members fully understand the implications of proposed procurement
statue(s). Congress must view changes with a TQM prospective.
b. Congressional Action Greatly Influences the Acquisition System
Congress has evolved the acquisition system through statutes and
regations, and it is Congress that must be on board with TQM philosophies in
orde, to make fundamental changes to restructure the system. Until Congress
adopl-s a TQM attitude, much action at lower levels will be wasted.
Overcome by: DoD should isolate influential congressional leaders
and visibly demonstrate how TQM reduces costs. Also, DoD should develop clear
TQIM objectives, articulate those objectives, and challenge Congress to embrace the
conc-!pt, philosophy, and reality of TQM.
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4. Analysis of the Characteristics
Deming is adamant that the top management in an organization must be
committed to the new quality philosophy, or the philosophy will fail. This raises
the question: who is top management for the DoD acquisition system? Is top
management for DoD the Secretary of Defense? Is it the President? Is it Congress?
Obviously, top management is politically shared and is therefore fundamentally
different from private sector business enterprises. All groups of respondents in
this research indicated that the Congress is at least near the top, and is probably
the de facto candidate for the "top management" billing for the DoD acquisition
system due to Congress' control over tLe budget and their influence over
acquisition statutes and regulations.
The public and the Congress clearly expect the DoD acquisition system
to operate in a rational, business-wise manner; optimizing the acquisition role
within DoD. But in actuality, the system influencing DoD acquisition managers'
decisions, is often one of a political consensus nature, not rationality. Expert and
VF respondents viewed TQM as being a rational process, however, they pointed
out, the environment that the acquisition system is closely linked to revolves
around a politically motivated process. They stated that vote gathering is the
politican's life blood, and that a politican's decisions will normally favor his
constituency. In turn, a decision framed in a political context, may directly conflict
with what is best for the system as a whole. One Expert responded that there is no
way to overcome this barrier. Another SF respondent said that education uf
politicians and voters regarding new quality principles would help alleviate this
element thus better aligning TQM and political thinking with one another.
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Expert and SF groups highlighted the element, Congressional action
greatly influences the acquisition system as characterization of Congressional
Oversight. Congress by law, has helped create the DoD acquisition system. The
legislative branch exerts more influence over the DoD acquisition system by their
oversight (with GAO), the budget, and statutory development. These respondents
pointed out that without support from key members of Congress, much of lower
management's efforts to implement TQM will be wasted. In order to obtain TQM
backing, the respondents convey the need for DoD to isolate key political
stakeholders in Congress and solicit their support for TQM efforts.
With regard to the Congressional Oversight, and specifically the
micromanagement aspect, all three respondent groups characterized the element
differently. Experts admitted that DoD has brought much of the
micromanagement upon itself. VF said that it discourages decision making, and
SF said that the detailed laws and regulations prove Congress' distrust of
acquisition managers.
Perhaps agreement over is who top management is not the overriding
question. The important question is: "In the DoD acquisition system environment
of shared management, are the law, regulation, and policy makers operating under
an umbrella of profound understanding regarding TQM principles?" The solutions
posed by the respondents indicate that DoD must recognize the shared power
nature of the DoD acquisition system and seek to influence political thinking
where possible to encompass TQM concepts. If, as Deming says, a large majority
of the problems a system faces are management problems--not the workforces',
then clearly Congress must be a partner in implementing TQM within the DoD.
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5. Summary of the Barrier, Congressional Oversight
The respondents explain that DoD's past inabilities to manage the
acquisition system effectively bring on Congressional Oversight, and that the very
nature of the Congress as keepers of the purse, gives them fiduciary responsibility
to the taxpayers to oversee the acquisition system. Acquisition managers have
responsibility to the taxpayers as well, but Congressional Oversight in the form of
detailed acquisition regulation have placed complicated and conflicting
requirements upon the system. All three groups acknowledge Congress'
significant influence over the acquisition system, with Experts and Very Familiar
respondents referring to Congress' inherent vote seeking nature as oft times
contrary to good business judgment and TQM principles. All three groups see
support from Congress regarding TQM concepts as a requirement for DoD to
receive the full benefit that TQM has to offer.
Following analysis, these elements were adopted from the comments of
Expert, VF, an SF respondents as potential solutions to the barrier, Congressional
Oversight:
* No way to overcome Congressional Oversight. Work with Congress for
continuous improvement.
" DoD should be more forthright with Congress concerning "bad news".
" DoD and defense contractors must perform more ethically (Build Congress'
trust).
* Educate Congress and the public regarding the faulty nature of some DoD
buying practices. Congress should view changes to the acquisition system
under the TQM umbrella.
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E. DOD ACCEPTANCE AND INSPECTION PROCEDURES
Ranked fourth in significance in the Top 1 Barriers (Table 4-5), this barrier is
viewed by respondents as being relatively difficult to overcome internally, but not
as difficult as CICA, Single Year Budgeting, and Congressional Oversight.
The following barrier categories are derived from the comments provided by
Expert, Very Familiar, and Somewhat Familiar respondents respectively. The
purpose is to summarize the barrier into subcategories to better determine its
perceived elements. These categories are not presented in any order of precedence.
The verbatim comments of expert respondents regarding DoD Acceptance and
Inspection Procedures are contained in Appendix E.
1. Characterization by Expert Respondents
a. Reliance on Tailgate Inspection Systems
The current methods of inspecting do not foster improvement of
processes and do not provide quality products.
Overcome by: The DoD needs to use acceptance and inspection
systems that place emphasis on process control and contractor self-inspection.
b. System does not Allow Contractors to Manage Their Own Processes
More significant improvements to quality would be achieved if the
acceptance and inspection system were modified to allow contractors to manage
processes, vice managing outcome(s) only.
Overcome by: The DoD should move rapidly to adopt In-Plant
Quality Evaluation (IQUE) concepts. (The IQUE program will be described in the
analysis section of this barrier.)
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c. System does not Foster Reductions in Costs
Not allowing contractors to manage processes fosters continuation of
a system of acceptance and inspection that adds costs to products rather than
reducing costs.
Overcome by: The DoD should move rapidly to adopt In-Plant
Quality Evaluation (IQUE) concepts.
d. Fosters Adversarial Relationships
The current system of Government acceptance and inspection does
not allow the buyer and supplier to establish a relationship based on trust.
Overcome by: The DoD should move rapidly to adopt In-Plant
Quality Evaluation (IQUE) concepts.
e. Guarantees Production and Sale of Defects to the Government
DoD's acceptance and inspection system gives defense contractors
profit for scrap and rework, thereby taking away their initiative to improve
quality.
Overcome by: The Government must improve operational
definitions associated with specifications, use statistical process control (SPC) and
Cpk's as substitution and augmentation of existing inspection requirements. The
Government should eliminate the use of AQLs and stop paying contractors profit
on scrap and rework.
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2. Characterization by Very Familiar Respondents
a. Reliance on Tailgate Inspection Systems
A respondent stated that the current system of acceptance and
inspection tries to ensure that quality material is received; however, many of the
existing inspection systems are elaborate and expensive. Also, the presence of in-
plant Government inspectors is a source of irritation for the supplier.
Overcome by: The Government should decrease oversight of
contractors by in-plant inspectors and replace the tailgate inspection mentality
with process oriented standards.
b. Refusal by Government Inspectors to Recognize Changes to
Processes and Specifications that Improve Quality
This view reflects the inflexibility of the Government's system
involving in-plant quality inspectors. The current system restricts contractors
from improving processes in order to reduce costs while supplying better quality
products.
Overcome by: Upper management must exert constant pressure to
allow contractors needed flexibility. Adequate training and Government-
Contractor teaming are absolutely essential. Government customers must be
willing to accept process change.
3. Characterization by Somewhat Familiar Respondents
There were no comments by Somewhat Familiar respondents concerning
the barrier, DoD Acceptance and Inspection Procedures. This is reflected in Table
4-5, Top 1 Barrier Rankings.
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4. Analysis of the Characteristics
The most widely applied procedures for acceptance and inspection used
by DoD to inspect the product of suppliers is based on statistical sampling and end
process inspection [Ref. 2 :p. 12-131. Developed at around the same time as
statistical process control (SPC) in the 1920's, statistical sampling inspection was
perfected during WW H within the defense industry, and remains the primary
means of inspecting and accepting today. This sampling method provides very late
feedback to the supplier regarding the control of manufacturing systems.
Inspection is performed at the end of the production cycle, vice testing conformance
during production [Ref. 2 3 :p. 218-2191.
There are several important lessons to learn from the comments
provided by the respondents in this study and the literature regarding inspection
and acceptance and how DoD typically performs these functions. First, the
opportunity to improve the quality of products is the greatest during the early
stages of design and production. Attempting to add or improve quality to existing
processes, vice fundamentally changing processes from the outset, will fail to make
the improvements that TQM has to offer [Ref. 22:p.6511 Ref. 23:p. 146]. Both Expert
and Very Familiar respondents referred to this as "tailgate inspection". These
respondents indicated that although the current system seeks to foster the
acceptance of quality products, it falls short in doing so. In fact, one expert
respondent stated that the current system guarantees the acceptance of defects.
This leads to another detrimental aspect of this barrier.
End-process inspection is very costly. One respondent said that the
tailgate inspection mentality leads to higher costs. Both Taguchi and Deming
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point out that large, end-of-the-line, quality assurance and inspection groups do
nothing to increase qual;ty, in fact they guarantee that defective product(s) will be
accepted [Ref. 5:p. 1331. Inspection at the end results in shipping defective
product(s), rework, or scrap. One expert respondent explained that his company
was planning a building expansion program at one plant cite. It turned out that
the expansion was needed to house all the rejected products awaiting rework!
Rework raises costs significantly. Besides labor, materials, and perhaps redesign
costs, this company was considering investing in poor quality products.
Deming's Point 3, Cease Dependence on Mass Inspection, claims that
evaluating quality at the end is too late. Warranties (not mentioned by any
respondents) are required by law to be in Doi) contracts pertaining to major
program contracts, and are indirectly paid for by the Government. Warranties are
an attempt to ensure that the Government is protecting itself from defects that are
inevitable under the current inspection system. Deming relates the story of a beer
manufacturer who said he had no problem with the quality of the cans he received
from his supplier. Any can that was found to be defective was replaced free by the
supplier (a good warrantee). "It had not occurred to him that his customers are
footing the bill" [Ref. 8: 281.
Emphasis was placed by all respondents on supplier self-inspection and
improvement of processes, rather than end of the line rework. Taguchi's statistical
methods for inspection (espoused by Deming) do not attack the "problem of mean
results, but instead concentrate on reducing variance around the average." [Ref.
23:p. 143] This is the intent of the In-Plant Quality Evaluation (IQUE) program
referred to by respondents as a means by which to overcome this barrier. The
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Defense Logistics Agency's (DLA), Defense Contract Management Command
(DCMC) has targeted 19,000 contractor facilities for implementation of this
program by June 1991 [Ref. 24:p. 1]. This very aggressive program focuses on
teamwork between the Government and contractor, as well as analysis of processes
vice end item inspection. One Expert respondent cited the adversarial relationship
that pervades the current system. That Expert also suggested that the IQUE
program would reduce this adversarial characteristic from the Government-
Industry relationship. This is encouraging in light of remarks provided by both
Expert and Very Familiar respondents indicating that there is too much in-plant
oversight of contractor performance. Additionally, Government inspectors are
inflexible in allowing the contractor to make improvements to processes, especially
when a procedure or specification definitively calls for that process to be performed
a certain way.
5. Summary of the Barrier, lDol) Acceptance and Inspection
Procedures
Both Expert and Very Familiar respondents refer to the current system
as "tailgate" in nature. Both also recognize the adversarial relationship which
operates under the tailgate system; especially when contractors may be trying to
improve processes, but Government oversight will not allow improvement without
extensive justification. Experts also speak to the additional costs that end process
inspection places on the buyer and supplier, but that the Government perpetuates
these costs by paying contractors profit for scrap and rework. All respondents
suggested overcoming the barrier involves empowering contractor's with self-
inspection and improvement of processes.
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Following analysis, these elements were adopted from the comments of
Expert, VF, an SF respondents as potential solutions to the barrier, DoD
Acceptance and Inspection Procedures:
" Emphasize contractor in-process inspection systems vice ailgate inspection.
" Adopt IQUE concepts.
" Specifications should provide clear, operational definitions of the work to be
performed.
" Use SPC and cost analysis to determine when inspection is necessary;
eliminate AQLs.
" Do not pay contractors profit for scrap and rework.
" Government and contractor teaming should be the norm--not adversarial
relationships.
F. SINGLE YEAR BUDGETING
This barrier was ranked fifth in the Top 1 Barriers listed in Table 4-5. It was
viewed by respondents as being second in degree of difficulty for DoD internal
change (see Figure 5-2).
The following characterizations of this barrier are derived from the
comments provided by Expert, Very Familiar, and Somewhat Familiar
respondents, respectively. The purpose is to summarize the barrier into
subcategories to better determine its perceived elements. These categories are not
intended to be presented in any order of precedence. The verbatim comments of
expert respondents regarding Single Year Budgeting are contained in Appendix F.
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1. Characterization by Expert Respondents
a. Does not Cultivate Long Term Process limprovements
The respondents stated that organizations have more difficulty
planning, investing, and implementing longer term strategies because of Single
Year budgeting. This barrier fosters processes that produce minimum quality
products.
Overcome by: No comments were provided by the respondents for
this element.
b. Contractors and Subcontractors Have a One Contract Horizon
The respondents indicated that longer term contracts receive more
investment and process improvement effort.
Overcome by: The DoD should initiate and assist in the educating
politicians and the general public regarding the effects of adverse buying practices
that do not place enough emphasis on the quality of products.
2. Characterization by Very Familiar Respondents
a. Drives the Acquisition System to ShortTerm Thinking and
Planning
One respondent indicated that without some degree of certainty for
follow-on business, it is difficult to justify investing in people and facilities.
Overcome by: No comments were provided by the respondents
for this element.
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3. Characterization by Somewhat Familiar Respondents
There were no comments by Somewhat Familiar respondents concerning
the barrier, Single Year Budgeting. This is reflected in Table 4-5, Top I Barrier
Ranking.
4. Analysis of the Characteristics
Despite a Six Year Defense Plan (SYDP) that annually seeks to outline
the DoD's budget through the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS)
and Congress' attempts at two year authorization legislation, the perception is
relatively high that the budget process outcome, a single year budget, is a major
barrier to implementing TQM principles in the DoD acquisition system. Two
aspects of this barrier were brought out in the respondent's comments. First, both
Expert and Very Familiar respondents linked the quality of the delivered products
to Single Year Budgeting. According to the respondents, uncertainty regarding
future business forces contractors to hold back on process improvements.
Therefore, the short term relationship that is fostered b. Single Year Budgeting
drives contractors to the utilization of processes that do not focus on continuous
improvement.
Secondly, all respondents (both Expert and Very Familiar) linked this
barrier to lack of investment by defense contractors. DoD has performed many
profit studies to determine why DoD contractors exhibit lower investment rates
than private sector contractors. Usually these studies have resulted in adjustment
of profit allowances structured by Government Contracting Officers in applying
the Weighted Guidelines. The respondents in this study did not link investment to
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profit as past profit studies have. They linked investment to long term buyer-
supplier relationships.
The respondents did not propose many ways that this barrier might be
overcome. The only comment provided focused on educating Congress and the
public regarding the faulty nature of Single Year Budgeting. This barrier overlaps
with CICA, due to the influence that Congressional actions and existing statutes
have on generally pervasive short term buyer-supplier relationships. The
comments of respondents indicate that the signal that Single Year Budgeting
sends to defense acquisition managers and contractors is one of uncertainty about
the future. Therefore there will quite naturally be a pervasive lack of long term
strategic planning and investment. Short horizons influence management
thinking both by DoD acquisition personnel and defense contractors. The
decisions these managers make are a direct product of the system that they work
within.
5. Summary of Barrier, Single Year Budgeting
The respondents portray this barrier as having detrimental effects on
investment levels that could focus on process improvement. They indicated that
this barrier contributes to short-term business decisions that produce short-term
payoffs to the detriment of long term planning, facilities investment, and training.
The short term nature of the relationships between DoD and suppliers is at least
partially attributable to Single Year Budgeting.
Following analysis, these elements were adopted from the conunents of
Expert, VF, an SF respondents as potential solutions to the barrier, Single Year
Budgeting:
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" Begin with education of politicians and the public regarding the benefits of
long-term buyer-supplier relationships.
" Significant investment will not occur without contractors having
commitment of future business.
G. MANAGENIENT MOBILITY
Management Mobility is the sixth ranked barrier in the Top 1 Barriers list
(Table 4-5). This barrier is perceived by respondents to be relatively less difficult
for the DoD to manage, internally, without significant changes to statue or
regulation.
The following barrier characterizations are derived from the comments
provided by Expert, Very Familiar, and Somewhat Familiar respondents
respectively. The purpose is to summarize the barrier into subcategories to better
determine its perceived elements. These categories are not intended to be
presented in any order of precedence. The verbatim comments of Expert
respondents regarding Management Mobility are contained in Appendix G.
1. Characterization by Expert Respondents
a. Leads to Short Term Decision Making
The respondents stated that transient terms of office influence short
term decisions and results. That is to say, that in order to impress superiors,
transient managers act in their own best interests rather than the organizations.
Overcome by: No comments were provided by the respondents for
this element.
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2. Characterization by Very Familiar Respondents
a. Constancy of Purpose Not Maintained
One respondent commented that Management Moblity is one factor
in creating a "survival" mentality by senior leadership, and that because of this,
organizations frequently face a lack of long range vision.
Overcome by: DoD and defense contractors should ensure that new
leaders and managers receive TQM training prior to taking top management
positions.
b. Discourages Forward Thinking
The respondents stated that because a manager's predecessor is
perceived as having been successful, there is little incentive to introduce new and
creative strategies for an organization.
Overcome by.- No comnents were provided by the respondents for
this element.
c. Encourages Managing the Process Vice Exercising Leadership
Some respondents were concerned with top management's tendency
to direct organizations "irough inspections and budgets rather than exercising
leadership.
Overcome by: No comments were provided by the respondents for
this element.
3. Characterization by Somewhat Familiar Respondents
There were no comments by Somewhat Familiar respondents concerning
the barrier, Management Mobility. This is reflected in Table 4-5, Top 1 Barrier
Ranking.
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4. Analysis of the Characteristics
According to the respondents in this study, Management Mobility has
several symptoms, most of which relate to its time influence on decision making
and planning. The Expert comments indicated that managers who know that their
stay in a position is short term, act much like politicians who are vote seeking,
except that managers are seeking quick results to impress their superiors (their
constituency). Very Familiar respondents point out that this barrier does not
maintain the constancy of purpose within an organization. Furthermore, the
respondents infer that this barrier may even inhibit the origin of constancy of
purpose within an organization due to its detrimental effects on forward thinking.
Such planning for constancy of purpose is seen as unnecessary, especially when the
previous regime was perceived successful by managing the numbers, vice
exercising leadership.
Deming relates the same conclusions, that Management Mobility fosters
quick results and annihilates teamwork within an organization (does not maintain
constancy of purpose). He names this barrier as one of his Deadly Diseases which
potentially block implementation of the cultural change that management is
responsible for initiating and maintaining. The job of management is inseparable
from the welfare of the enterprise, Deming says [Ref 8:p. 120-121]. But how can a
manager view his operation in the long term prospective, when the system he
operates within drives him to short term thinking, i.e., pleasing the boss at all
costs?
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One Very Familiar respondent indicated that managers regard
management by the numbers (or process), as leadership. They manage with an
audit mentality of oversight, traditionally deemed leadership.
The respondents in this study seem resigned to this barrier as a fact of
business within the Government and the defense industry. Only one solution to
overcoming this barrier was presented by the respondents. That solution focused
on the prerequisites of new managers entering an organization in leadership
positions. The proposal is that managers entering leadership positions should
receive training in TQM principles prior to entering new positions. This would at
least provide an assurance to the workforce that some semblance of constancy of
purpose will be maintained.
5. Summary of the Barrier, Management Mobility
The results indicate that Management Mobility reduces the manager's
t,,idency to make decisions that are long-term in nature, vice optimization of
factors for short-term personal success. The bottom line is that management
mobility naturally induces a short-term results mentality because the manager
knows that his success is based on his boss' perception of his performance, which
has traditionally been viewed as responsiveness for quick results.
To overcome this barrier, the solution provided by respondents was as
follows:
* Respondents indicated that new managers or leaders should receive TQM
training prior to assuming the leadership role.
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H. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter analyzed the six barriers that were ranked as the most
significant by the questionnaire respondents. The barriers were as follows:
Management Willingness to Change, CICA, Congressional Oversight, DoD
Acceptance and Inspection Procedures, Single Year Budgeting, and Management
Mobility.
These barriers represent a cross section of cultural boundaries, political
inhibitors, and statutory confinements, all of of which affect the successful
implementation of TQM in the DoD acquisition system. Deming would likely say
that as goes management, so goes the rest. If management were to approach
implementation with a profound understanding of the key elements would
naturally come under control.
Management Willingness to Change was viewed as the most significant
barrier. This illustrates the fundamental shift in management's understanding
and support for TQM which still must occur before many of the other less
significant barriers can be reduced.
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V1. CONCIUSIONS ANI) ItECONIMENI)A'I'ONS
A. INTROi)UCTION
The Philadelphia Area Council for Excellence (PACE) Quality Round Table
Companies in Philadelphia originally outlined nine phases to bring about change
under Deming's quality concepts. InstituLionalization was phase nine:
Institutionalization "occurs when all of Deming's Fourteen Points are the natural
way to carry out operations. Pervasive, never-ending improvement, with a
constancy of purpose is a way of life". [Ref. 6:p. 2061
The objective of this research was to determine what barriers stand in the
way to institutionalization of TQM in the DoD acquisition system, which ol'the
barriers are the most significant, and finally, determine how those barriers might
generally be overcome.
H. CONCLUSIONS
1. Significant barriers exist which threaten institutionalization of
'l'QM in the Il)o acquisition system.
There are many barriers to institutionalization of TQM in the
acquisition system. The six most significant barriers determined in this study
were: Management Willingness to Change, The Competition in Contracting Act of
1984, Congressional Oversight, DoD Acceptance and Inspection Procedures, Single
Year Budgeting, and Management Mobility. These barriers were identified from
the research questionnaire and were analyzed in Chapter V. Other barriers were
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identified in this study; however, the six barriers analyzed herein closely represent
where leadership should place emphasis for the resolution of impediments.
2. Institutionalization of TQM involves a cultural shift in how
managers view leadership.
This study concludes that top management creates the environment for
total quality concepts to flourish. Respondents in this research indicated that Lop
management tends to lead to managing inspections and budgets. This is not to say
that these elements do not have a place; however, they should not be preeminent.
As brought out in Chapter V, the system that DoD mat,agers work within demands
,)f them attention to this method of leadership. The system does not demand, nor
does it reward quality and continuous improvement. Only top management has
the ability to create systems that encourage others working within the system to
manage with the customer in mind.
3. Barriers rooted in statute or regulations demand leadership's
attention.
Some barriers might be overcome by changing law or regulations. These
barriers represent externally controlled barriers and internally controlled
barriers. The environment that has evolved into what is known as the DoD
acquisition system is affected by both impediment types.
Statutes such as the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, and a
myriad of regulations which do not fundamentally fit with total quality concepts,
must be effectively challenged for their total quality contribution(s) or non-value
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added costs. If fundamental and systemic transformations are not initiated, the
environment for total quality will not proceed beyond assisting to improve process
oriented operations.
4. A prerequisite qualification for military and civilian command
positions must include a profound underst' ding of total quality.
Management's transient behavior throughout the DoD will be difficult to
improve in the short-term; however, emphasis on insisting that military command,
or senior civilian positions, require a profound understanding of total quality
concepts prior to entering organizational leadership positions, would raise the
level of top management to total quality. This increase in commitment would be
perceived by the workforce. A cadre of staff who understand total quality is
necessary. But they cannot be relied upon to cultivate the required environment.
Top management relinquishing responsibility for total quality to a staff of'
advocates portends likeness to a business-as-usual atmosphere.
5. The political environment, which thoroughly influences the l)oi)
acquisition system, also affects I)ol)'s ability to institutionalize
total quality.
This study concludes that the political environment that frames the DoD
acquisition system must be recognized and accepted by those in DoD who
profoundly understand TQM. The potential or realism associated with overcoming
some barriers differs widely between others. For instance, it is unlikely that
Congressional Oversight will lessen in the near future. Expert total quality
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advocates in this study pointed out that it is Congress' fiduciary responsibility to
oversee the expenditure of funds. They also point out that Congress must be co-
opted in the implementation of total quality concepts in the DoD acquisition sys-
tem. Likewise, Congress must recognize (as indicated by respondents very famil-
iar or somewhat familiar with 'QM concepts) that too much oversight enhances an
image of distrust, thereby reinforcing a protectionist mentality by DoD managers
against Congress. There is too much competition between Congress and Do[), and
not enough cooperation. Overcoming this requires a profound understanding of to-
tal quality by DoD and Congress.
Another aspect of the political environment involves the competitive es-
sence of political survival, i.e., politician's must compete for votes and oft times the
DoD acquisition system becomes the platform. Overcoming this barrier may in-
volve the adoption by either party of a platform which openly advocates total qual-
ity concepts for use in industry and Government.
6. Enhancement of Government customer and contractor supplier
long term relationships is required if total quality is to be
institutionalized within Dol).
Numerous studies have sought to determine what levels of profit on de-
fense contracts are both reasonable and stimulate investment within the defense
industrial base. The analysis in Chapter V shows that profit may not have the ef-
fect on business investment behavior as now currently believed. Respondents
herein indicated that longer term buyer-supplier relationships would stimulate
greater investment in manufacturing capabilities. The study showed that short
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term relationships are systemic in nature due to the Competition in Contracting
Act of 1984 and Single Year Budgeting. Furthermore, a reduction of only one of
these barriers may not be enough to reduce the symptom: a short-term buyer-
supplier relationship.
The study also highlights the conclusion that the quality of products
bought by DoD will increase when the number of suppliers is reduced. Best value
contractors who practice both product and process improvement would be reward-
ed with longer term business relationships with the DoD.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
I. The top management in t)ol) should fully embrace the entire
concept of TQM with a particular emphasis on leadership and
commitment.
Without leadership and commitment by management, TQM will fail as
just another program. The researcher, in the course of study, found poor orienta-
tion by peers who perceived that they had leariied everything there is to TQM.
Students were turned-off by speakers who tried to sell TQM to them. They wanted
to see concrete examples of top management living out rQM. 'Top management
must provide leadership and commitment for continuous improvement and edu-
cate all regarding the long term, serious, nature with which TQM must be viewed.
Top management must be able to articulate organizational missions with a pro-
found understanding of TQM. It cannot be learned in a three hour training ses-
sion. Top DoD management, and top Service management must continue to sup-
port the cultural change implied by TQM. Management must not
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lose the long term perspective, that the cultural change may take several decades
to come to fruition within DoD.
2. l)ol) acquisition commands should use tailored questionnaires,
much like the one in this research, to obtain definitive feedback
from employees regarding the implementation of TQM.
The study of barriers within an organization is imperative in determin-
ing the progress of implementing TQM. The results of such a survey should not be
utilized to tamper with acquisition management practices, but rather enable man-
agement to see shortcomings of the implementation process.
3. New acquisition policies or initiatives should be evaluated and
presented to the defense establishment under the umbrella
concept of'l'QM.
Contractors and Government personnel should not perceive changes as
just other programs that they are forced to comply with. If a new policy, regula-
tion, or program is initiated, it should be clearly articulated in such a manner as to
make it apparent as to how it fits with '1'QM principles. Top management must be
willing to enforce the TQM umbrella concept for acquisition policy analysis.
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4. DloD leaders in conjunction with professional and industry
associations should take every opportunity to involve politicians
(national, state, and local) and their staffs in TQM education.
This might be accomplished by inviting key Congressional members to
seminars and symposia relating to total quality. In addition, education of the pub-
lic in appropriate forums will increase constituency concern for total quality con-
cept in applied government.
5. The Competition in Contracting Act should be reviewed for those
elements which are counter to or inhibit TQM and appropriately
modified.
The researcher does not recommend efforts to immediately repeal the
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984. The following recommendations are made
regarding the barrier that CICA represents:
a) A more comprehensive study should be performed to determine the
full extent that CICA represents a barrier to TQM.
b) Study the steps that DoD can take to establish long term relation-
ships with suppliers within the present CICA requirements.
c) Competition "savings" as indicated by the Services' Competition Ad-
vocate Generals should be balanced with studies to find the costs of
competing:
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6. Defense Contract Management Command programs, such as In-
plant Quality Evaluation (IQUE.), should continue
implementation.
Initiatives that foster longer term buyer-supplier relationships and con-
tractor improvement of product and processes will show Government commitment
and institutionalize ''QM concepts. The results (costs) of such initiatives should be
maintained and analyzed. Other DoD Agencies should adopt IQUE concepts.
7. Advancement and rewards for individuals should be tied to the
long range goals of the organization.
A viable rewards structure, with a TQM basis, should be linked to long
range organizational goals. Under the current system for both military and civil
service employees, incentives are linked only to short term actions, not long term
contributions to an organization. The rewards systems that really count, promo-
tions, are not linked to total quality concepts and do not therefore induce TQM be-
havior to the fullest extent.
I). RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What is the concept of TQM, principally as approached by Dr. W.
Edwards Deming? What is l)ol)'s concept?
Deming does not refer to the quality philosophy that he teaches as TQM.
Deming teaches a holistic manner of continuous improvement based on what he
terms, Profound Understanding, i.e., Appreciation for a System, Statistical theory
(theory of variation), a theory of Knowledge, and a theory PsycOiogy. Deming
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developed the concept of Profound Understanding, the 14 Points, and the Deadly
Diseases so that American, analytic thinkers, could grasp the elements of holistic
thinking that Japanese business applied naturally.
DoD appears to conceptualize and teach TQM as a tool to be used in im-
plementing various process strategies. DoD does not currently stress that people
must be involved in a cultural change in order to view the world differently. DoD's
emphasis thus far has only been on improving the process.
2. How does TQM differ from traditional management concepts
currently practiced by Dol)?
DoD is in a transitional phase regarding use of applied TQM concepts in
management. 'rQM as it applies to the acquisition system is focusing much needed
attention on the quality and desirability of the product received from contractors.
DoD acquisition managers are beginning the move from reliance on the final prod-
uct inspection to in-process product testing and inspection. Application ofTrQM to
strategic business management practices within the DoD acquisition system, have
not yet begun, e.g., linking TQM to the PPBS system.
3. What statutes, regulations, :olicies, or work ethics act as the most
significant impediments to institutionalizing ''QM concepts in the
l)ol) acquisition process?
The principal impediments to institutionalization of TQM as discussed
herein were: Management Willingness to Change, The Competition in Contracting
Act of 1984, Congressional Oversight, DoD Acceptance and Inspection Procedures,
Single Year Budgeting, and Management Mobility. Other impediments identified
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in the study included: Training, DoD Specifications, Contractor Cost Recovery
Systems, Ethics, Soclo-economic Programs, Labor Unions, the Buy American Act,
and OMB Circular A-109.
4. low might the impediments or barriers be reduced or
eliminated?
Management Willingness to Change was determined to he the most sig-
nificant barrier to institutionalization of'l'QM in the DoD acquisition system. This
illustrates the fundamental shift in management's understanding, commitment,
and support for TQM which must occur before many of the other less significant
barriers can be reduced. Profound understanding and commitment to total quality
concepts, along with leadership by top management are the three main ingredients
to overcoming most of the impediments facing institutionalization of TQM in the
DoD acquisition system.
E. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1. Study the economic differences between cooperation and competition as
described by Deming. Is cooperation rather than competition really a
different economic system, or is it a variation of supply and demand
economics? Review of antitrust laws and their impact on the DoD
acquisition system would be appropriate.
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2. Study specific statutes that are acquisition system related TQM barriers.
Analyze the statutes separately to determine exactly the legal
foundation for that barrier. Study also the original intent of the law to
determine if the original intent can be rationally preempted using TQM
concepts. Start with the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984.
3. Study the link between long term buyer-supplier relationships and
contractor investment levels. Is there a stronger link between the length
and non-adversarial relationship versus the level of profit on shorter
term contracts?
4. Study how to apply TQM as a tool for strategy development and compare
the results to TQM as a tool for implementing strategy. Can any
strategy be implemented applying TQM principles? Is a profound
knowledge of TQM necessary to develop a strategy that will eventually
be implemented using TQM? What are the implications for acquisition
strategy planning?
5. Perform a follow-on study to determine if Management Willingness to
Change remains the top barrier after some period of time. Remember




SUBJECT: BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTING TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT
(TQM) PRINCIPLES IN THE DOD ACQUISITION PROCESS
DISCUSSION: TQM is the management philosophy espoused by the Department of Defense.
This management philosophy portrayed by Dr. W. Edwards Deming in his Fourteen Points, conflicts
with many of DoD's acquisition and non-acquisition related regulations, policies, and
congressionally imposed statue(s).
PURPOSE: The purpose of this study is to gather data which reflect the opinions of
government and industry business decision makers who are knowledgeable of Dr. Deming's
Fourteen Points and the DoD acquisition process. Specifically this questionnaire will seek to
identify impediments based on statute, regulation or policy, that stand in the path of DoD
towards fully implementing TQM. It is recognized that DoD's definition of TQM and the Fourteen
Points do not entirely match, however, in order to provide a common basis from which to
characterize TQM, Dr. Deming's Fourteen Points and Deadly Diseases are utilized herein.
For reference, Deming's 14 points are as follows:
1. Create constancy of purpose for improvement of product and service.
2. Adopt the new philosophy
3. Cease dependence on inspection to achieve quality.
4. End the practice of awarding business on the basis of price tag alcne. Instead, minimize
total cost by working with a single supplier.
5. Improve constantly and forever every process for planning, production, and service
6. Institute training on the job
7 Adopt and institute leadership.
8. Drive out fear.
9. Break down barriers between staff areas.
10. Eliminate slogans, exhortations, and targets for the work force.
11. Eliminate numerical quotas for the work force and numerical goals for management.
12. Remove barriers that rob people of pride of workmanship. Eliminate the annual rating or
merit system.
13. Institute a vigorous program of education and self-improvement for everyone.
14. Put everybody in the company to work to accomplish the transformation
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In addition, Dr. Deming points out the Deadly Diseases which impact on the success or failure of
implementation of the Fourteen Points (it is recognized that several of these are societal in
nature):
1. Lack of constancy of purpose to plan product and service that will have a market and keep
the company in business, and provide jobs.
2. Emphasis on short -term profits.
3. Evaluation of performance, merit rating, or annual review.
4. Mobility of management; job hopping.
5. Management by use only of visible figures, with little or no consideration of figures that
are unknown or unknowable.
6. Excessive medical costs.
7. Excessive costs of liability, swelled by lawyers that work on contingency fees.
REQUESTED ACTION: It is requested that the survey be completed by an expert familiar
with DoD's acquisition process, as well as familiar with Dr. Deming's quality concepts. Quality
responses by expert opinion will be highly regarded.




" No. years acquisition experience





Note: If you marked Expert or Very Familiar, please briefly explain your exposure to Dr
Deming's concepts:




SECTION II - BARRIER IDENTIFICATION
Below are listed often cited barriers to implementing TQM in the DoD acquisition process In
completing this section please select either YES or NO to indicate whether or not you perceive the
listed category to be a barrier to successfully implementing TQM in the DoD acquisition process. IF
YOU CHOOSE YES, INDICATE, BY NUMBER,THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THAT BARRIER BY USING THE
FOLLOWING MEASURES:
1 NOT SIGNIFICANT 4. VERY SIGNIFICANT
2. SOMEWHAT SIGNIFICANT 5 INSURMOUNTABLE
3 SIGNIFICANT
Also, please list whether a barrier is primarily driven by Government Law or Regulation (GLR),
Internal Policy (IP), or Neither (N).
Barrier YES NO Don't Know GLRI IP I N
1. Management Willingness to Change
2. Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 _
3. Buy American
4. DoD Acceptance and Inspection Procedures
5 DoD Specifications -
6, Industrial Base Concerns
7. Contractor Cost Recovery Systems -
8. Ethics
9. Training
10, Socio-Economic Programs -
11 Industry Labor Unions
12. Congressional Oversight -
13. Single Year Budgeting
14. Management Mobility
15. OMB Circular A- 109
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Please list other significant categories you feel are barriers:
16,___________________ 
____
17 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
_ _ _ _
18._ 
_ __ _
SECTION III - BARRIER RANKINGS
In this section, please rank the five (5) barriers you perceive to be the most significant towards
impeding implementation of TQM concepts in DoD's acquisition process.
(Please place the Barrier number from SECTION 11 in the space provided.)
1st Most Significant Barrier
2nd Most Significant Barrier_____
3rd Most Significant Barrier_____
4th Most Significant Barrier_____
5th Most Significant Barrier 
_____
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SECTION IV - TOP BARRIER OPEN EXPLANATION
In this section, please choose the two categories, which to you, represent the most significant
barriers to implementing TQM in the DoD acquisition process. Along with naming the categories
please briefly explain why you perceive these barriers as the most significant and how these
barriers might be overcome Discussion of professional experience and insights are respectfully
requested in this section (please use additional space if needed).
BARRIER 1 (Why is this barrier significant, and how might it be overcome?):
BARRIER 2 (Why is this barrier significant, and how might it be overcome?):
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APPENI)iX I
QUOTATIONS FROM EXPERT'I' RESIONI)EN'I'S CONCERNING 'TIE
BARRIER: MANAGEMENT' WIIlIINGNESS'I'O CIIANGE
Management's willingness to change has been identified as one of the Key
Barriers in implementing a Total Quality Management Program. TQM, as in
all organizational changes, is viewed by management as a threat to their
operations. Managers who have been rewarded and promoted in the past for
following a certain philosophy are now being required to change that
philosophy. Because management controls 85 to 95 percent of a company's
operation/processes, they significantly influence the type of change, the
direction of the change, and how fast change can be implemented. The only
way to overcome this barrier is through education. Managers must fully
understand the new philosophy and what is expected. The message that must
be transmitted, is that in the future managers who follow the new philosophy
will be the individuals who will be rewarded and promoted.
U.S. managers still believe that they are inherently superior to managers
in other nations. This arrogance is found in senior managers in the military,
in the defense industry and in commercial industry. I have worked in all three
areas. Only time, education and threats to an organization's survival will
change this.
Change in attitude and behavior of managers is required, especially higher
level managers. Most senior managers have been judged successful and
therefore have little felt need to change. This can be overcome in a significant
way with only a proportion of them. It takes some combination of education,
persuasive staff, peer influence, supervisor influence, and compelling
examples that they can relate to.
Leadership is what makes the process work and provides the positive
environment for value added efforts. However, I have experienced significant
reluctance on the part of leadership to make TQM a way, to cultivate a
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creative and holistic approach to improving processes. This most important
category will take years, probably decades to truly change.
TQM can work only if top management is committed and creates an
environment where TQM can flourish (e.g., individual respected, fear
removed, good ideas encouraged, willingness to change, etc.). In order to
overcome this barrier, management must go through a conversion process and
become TQM advocates. TQM training and exposure to success stories from
government and private industry can help to overcome this barrier.
Attendance at "GOAL" (Growth Opportunity Alliance of Greater Lawrence)
and "PACE" (Philadelphia Area Council for Excellence) seminars are good
examples of where success stories can be heard.
Great difficulty finding a decision maker. Bureaucrats (are) more
interested in personal reputation vs. good of the government. Lots of talk, but
not backed up with resources and personal commitment over the long term.
The government does not measure (quantify in dollars) the cost of unquality.
To overcome: 1) issue directive with "teeth", 2) supported by appropriate TQM
training, 3) make it part of the organizational management system to identify
unquality cost and manage its reduction.
Constancy of Purpose Imanagement related). It is relatively easy to state
that quality is most important, but very hard to stick to when a person is being
measured on short-term performance, dollars saved, speed of delivery.. .When
pressure is on, what will happen? Also, is the purpose clear and accepted by all
DoD officers? Or is each one doing his "own thing", calling it Dol) policy?
Poor Enuwronment (management related). Environment is vital to TQM
success. Simply issuing an instruction requiring TQM implementation doesn't
get the job done. People can only be converted through example, where
managers follow through with actions that support the written instructions.
Employees can quickly identify hypocritical behavior by managemeat. This
barrier can be overcome by management adopting and living up to the TQM
principles on a daily basis. When employees realize that the environment has
really changed, then TQM implementation can begin in earnest and real
progress can be made.
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Communication (management related). Communication is necessary to
convey information from the top to the bottom. To convey feedback, customer
concern, sharing information that results in reducing waste. Improving
communication is difficult; the barriers between commands, divisions, officers,
individuals, is beyond belief. The idea that the more information you have
that no one else has makes you more important to the process has made us a
country of individualists. We must overcome this reluctance to communicate
and cooperate and understand that in the 2 1st century, communications will
make the difference in failure or success.
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AI'iNI)IX C
QUOTATIONS FROM EX1PERT 'ItESI)ONI)I'TS CONCEItNING T'Iil,"
BAItRIER: COMPETITION ANI) CONTRACTING ACT OF 1984
CICA requires multiple sources and fosters carrying poor quality
contractors instead of developing relationships with proven contractors who
deliver high quality, timely products and services. Amend CICA and do not
continue internal policy that makes CICA more restrictive than laws require.
Here again the mere fact that one must always take the low bidder will
destroy any attempt to cultivate long term relationships with suppliers.
Adversarial relationships are the norm under the guile of always awarding the
low bidder. How to overcome this barrier? A gain, education is a partiatl
answer. The law should be amended to allow forlong term relationships to be
established and contracts should be awarded on quality as well as price. The
total cost to the system should be the controlling factor rather than price.
Competition within the same industry leads to the waste of scarce resources
by duplicated researches performed in various companies without any
coordination. Also competition in price cutting in the bidding systems
guarantees the deterioration of quality. Antitrust regulations must be totally
rewritten.
CICA has made it extremely difficult to make changes in the acquisition
process. There are so many rules, regulations, and restrictions, that it is
virtually impossible to change the process without changing the law.
Although (DoD activity) made some minor changes to the internal process by
changing the priority system, they were unable to influence vendor selection,




QUOTAT'1IONS FRONI EX1PERT It ESI'ONI)EN'TS CONCERNING TIIE
BARRIER; CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Congress is a major influence in the DoD acquisition process. Major
changes cannot be made to the acquisition process without the backing of key
people in Congress. Until these key people understand and embrace total
quality approaches, it will be impossible to introduce major cultural and
systems changes required.
The Congress micro manages and with great justification; cost over-runs, Ill
Wind, etc., etc.. TQM/Deming places much emphasis on trust and ethical
behavior. 'T'he Congress has a fiduciary responsibility to the U.S. taxpayer ! it
will be hard to give up oversight given the problems of the last 20 years. I have
no solution other than DoD/defense contractors doing better and being more
open with the Congress; B-1 cost overrun disclosures (or lack of) is a prime
example.
Congressional Oversight coupled with Single Year Budgeting: This
combination does not allow for the cultivation of long term suppliers who could
install cost saving processes and better controlled processes if they knew that
they would still be a supplier when this contract is over. How to overcome this
barrier? Education is a start. Convincing a self-serving politician that he
should look at the whole rather than count votes is difficult. Education of the
general public on not accepting shoddy buying practices may be a start, but I
see this as a major stumbling block. We have few examples within private
industry to enhance any sort of change.
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APPENI)IX E
QUOTATIONS FROM EXPERT RESPONI)ENTS CONCERNING TIle
BARRIER: )O) ACCEPTANCE AN) INSPECTION PROCEI)URES
We need to improve our processes and get those who are part of the process
to act as owners. Individuals must each be responsible for inspecting their own
work. Must not rely on tailgate inspection procedures.
DoD acceptance and inspection procedures affects letting the contractor
control processes and manage by processes. (This barrier) adds unnecessary
cost and fosters lack of trust and common sense supplier
operation/relationships. Move rapidly toward total IQUE concepts.
The use of AQL's (average quality limits) allows contractors to sell defects
to the government and inhibits willingness to improve. Allowing profit to
contractors for scrap and rework costs inhibits willingness to improve
processes. Lack of good operation definition ingovernment specification leads
to poor inspection and bad quality. Use of SPO and Cpk's as substitution for
and augmentation of existing inspection requirements, eliminate use of AQLs,
stop paying contractors profit on scrap and rework!
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APIPENI)tX F
QUOTATIONS FROM EXPERT RESPONi)ENTS CONCERNING TIlE
BARRIER: SINGLE YEAR BUDGETING
Single year budgeting does not foster long term process improvements. It
fosters just getting the job done with the minimum quality required.
Investment in better tools and training is hard to justify.
Single year budgeting [for TQM training] has a detrimental impact on long
term improvement. TQM training and implementation does not extend into
multiyear needs like hardware procurement. Some method must be provided
for approval of funding up to 3 years. This allows an organization to develop
and implement a long term strategy. To overcome: allow TQM funding to
cover TQM strategy period; verify by monitoring cost.
Congressional Oversight coupled with Single Year Budgeting: This
combination dues not allow for the cultivation of long term suppliers who could
install cost saving processes and better controlled processes if they knew that
they would still be a supplier when this contract is over. How to overcome this
barrier? Education is a start. Convincing a self-serving politician that he
should look at the whole rather than count votes is difficult. Education of the
general public on not accepting shoddy buying practices may be a start, but I
see this as a major stumbling block. We have few examples within private
industry to enhance any sort of change. (This statement was previously
quoted in Appendix C.)
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AI1PENDIX G
QUOTATIONS FROM EXPERT RESPONI)EN'I'S CONCERNING TtlE
HARRIER: MANAGEMENT MOBIlITY
Management mobility leads to short-term decision making. If I am to be
measured on my two years in this position, I need something to show during
those two years. What happens later has no effect on my rating, rank, or
compensation. This has been made clear to me by 2 generals who expressed
interest in learning more about TQM - they want short-term visible results
that can be documented or they are not interested.
We continue to rotate our senior acquisition management cadre (military)
in two year lor less) cycles. Each new manager is unwilling to change what his
predecessor has done especially if he (the predecessor) was not unsuccessful.
Because the assignment is short term, there is no long term constancy of
purpose, but simply a survival mentality. This discourages forward thinking.
There is a disproportionate focus on managing the process vice exercising
leadership. (Quote taken from a Very Familiar respondent.)
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